Reciprocal Deposits and Incremental Bank Risk
Even after controlling for other observable factors, reciprocal deposits are associated with higher bank risk as measured by the probability of failure and the Zscore. These results are consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis and reject the risk substitution hypothesis.
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