A labor market with targeted wage offers
We model a market for highly skilled workers, such as the academic job market. The outputs of firm-worker matches are heterogeneous and common knowledge. Wage setting is synchronous with search: firms simultaneously make one personalized o¤er each to the worker of their choice. With large frictions (delay costs), efficient coordination is not possible, but for small frictions efficient matching with Diamond-type monopsony wages is an equilibrium.
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- Jonathan Levin & Jeremy Bulow, 2004.
"Matching and Price Competition,"
Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings
350, Econometric Society.
- Hideo Konishi & Margarita Sapozhnikov, 2006.
"Decentralized Matching Markets with Endogenous Salaries,"
Boston College Working Papers in Economics
654, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 03 Jan 2008.
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