The provision of quality in a bilateral search market
We accomplish two goals. First, we provide a non-cooperative foundation for the use of the Nash bargaining solution in search markets. This finding should help to close the rift between the search and the matching-and-bargaining literature. Second, we establish that the diversity of quality offered (at an increasing price-quality ratio) in a decentralized market is an equilibrium phenomenon - even in the limit as search frictions disappear.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2002|
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- Helmut Bester, 1988.
"Bargaining, Search Costs and Equilibrium Price Distributions,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 55(2), pages 201-214.
- Bester,Helmut, 1986. "Bargaining,Search costs and equilibrium price distribution," Discussion Paper Serie A 49, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Bester, Helmut, 1993. "Bargaining versus Price Competition in Markets with Quality Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 278-288, March.
- Gale, Douglas M, 1986. "Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 785-806, July.
- Sakovics, J. & Ponsati, C., 1995. "Rubinstein Batgaining with Tow-Sided Options," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 318.95, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1972. "A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 80-106, January. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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