IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ecm/wc2000/0359.html

A Theory of Firm Formation and Skills Acquisition

Author

Listed:
  • Bryan Ellickson

    (University of California)

  • Birgit Grodal

    (University of Copenhagen)

  • Suzanne Scotchmer

    (University of California)

  • William Zame

    (University of California)

Abstract

We present a theory of production that begins with an exogenously specified set of technologies, accessible to each potential firm. The technologies used in equilibrium are endogenous. Labor skills are differentiated, and the labor skills are acquired endogenously by workers, possibly by bearing private costs, and possibly by attending school. A technology can be used by a group of agents having the appropriate skills. We allow that workers care about the production plans in their firms, and will accept lower compensation to satisfy their preferences on production plans. In a continuum model, we show what price systems are required so that competitive equilibrium exists and core outcomes are equivalent to competitive outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Bryan Ellickson & Birgit Grodal & Suzanne Scotchmer & William Zame, 2000. "A Theory of Firm Formation and Skills Acquisition," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0359, Econometric Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0359
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/0359.pdf
    File Function: main text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bryan Ellickson & Birgit Grodal & Suzanne Scotchmer & William R. Zame, 1999. "Clubs and the Market," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1185-1218, September.
    2. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
    3. Ichiishi,Tatsuro, 1993. "The Cooperative Nature of the Firm," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521414449, January.
    4. Ellickson, Bryan & Grodal, Birgit & Scotchmer, Suzanne & Zame, William R., 2001. "Clubs and the Market: Large Finite Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(1), pages 40-77, November.
    5. Roland Benabou, 1993. "Workings of a City: Location, Education, and Production," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 108(3), pages 619-652.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bryan Ellickson & Birgit Grodal & Suzanne Scotchmer & William R. Zame, 2006. "The Organization of Production, Consumption and Learning," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Christian Schultz & Karl Vind (ed.), Institutions, Equilibria and Efficiency, chapter 9, pages 149-185, Springer.
    2. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2018. "A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(2), pages 735-760.
    3. Luque, Jaime, 2013. "Heterogeneous Tiebout communities with private production and anonymous crowding," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 117-123.
    4. Xiong, Siyang & Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2007. "Core equivalence theorem with production," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 246-270, November.
    5. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller & Hideo Konishi, 2015. "Household formation and markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(3), pages 461-507, August.
    6. Hatfield, John William & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2015. "Multilateral matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 175-206.
    7. Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans, 2011. "Groups, collective decisions and markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 275-299, January.
    8. Milchtaich, Igal & Winter, Eyal, 2002. "Stability and Segregation in Group Formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 318-346, February.
    9. Jaime Luque, 2014. "Wages, local amenities and the rise of the multi-skilled city," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 52(2), pages 457-467, March.
    10. Bhowmik, Anuj & Saha, Sandipan, 2022. "On blocking mechanisms in economies with club goods," MPRA Paper 114928, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Dokow, Elad & Luque, Jaime, 2019. "Provision of local public goods in mixed income communities," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 1-1.
    12. Baccara, Mariagiovanna & Yariv, Leeat, 2016. "Choosing peers: Homophily and polarization in groups," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 152-178.
    13. Bhowmik, Anuj & Saha, Sandipan, 2023. "Restricted bargaining sets in a club economy," MPRA Paper 119210, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Japneet Kaur, 2023. "Stable sets in economies with club goods," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2023-011, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    15. Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans, 2006. "Clubs and Households," CEPR Discussion Papers 5687, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Wooders, Myrna, 2008. "Market games and clubs," MPRA Paper 33968, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Dec 2010.
    17. Mauleon, Ana & Roehl, Nils & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, "undated". "Constitutions and Social Networks," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 206451, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    18. Nizar Allouch & Myrna Wooders, 2004. "Price Taking Equilibrium in Club Economies with Multiple Memberships and Unbounded Club Sizes," Working Papers 513, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    19. Stephen Salant & Nathan Seegert, 2018. "Should Congestion Tolls be Set by the Government or by the Private Sector? The Knight–Pigou Debate Revisited," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 85(339), pages 428-448, July.
    20. Barberà, Salvador & Beviá, Carmen & Ponsatí, Clara, 2015. "Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 237-257.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0359. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Christopher F. Baum (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/essssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.