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Financial imbalances and financial fragility

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  • Boissay, Frédéric

Abstract

This paper develops a general equilibrium model to analyse the link between financial imbalances and financial crises. The model features an interbank market subject to frictions and where two equilibria may (co-)exist. The normal times equilibrium is characterized by a deep market with highly leveraged banks. The crisis times equilibrium is characterized by bank deleveraging, a market run, and a liquidity trap. Crises occur when there is too much liquidity (savings) in the economy with respect to the number of (safe) investment opportunities. In effect, the economy is shown to have a limited liquidity absorption capacity, which depends JEL Classification: E21, F36, G01, G21

Suggested Citation

  • Boissay, Frédéric, 2011. "Financial imbalances and financial fragility," Working Paper Series 1317, European Central Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20111317
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    File URL: https://www.ecb.europa.eu//pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1317.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Guojin & Liu, Yanzhen & Zhang, Yu, 2020. "Can systemic risk measures predict economic shocks? Evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    2. Agur, Itai, 2014. "Bank risk within and across equilibria," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 322-333.
    3. Carlos A. Carrasco & Felipe Serrano, 2014. "Global and European Imbalances:A critical review," Working papers wpaper42, Financialisation, Economy, Society & Sustainable Development (FESSUD) Project.
    4. Cyril Monnet & Daniel R. Sanches, 2015. "Private Money and Banking Regulation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(6), pages 1031-1062, September.
    5. Frédéric Boissay & Fabrice Collard & Frank Smets, 2016. "Booms and Banking Crises," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(2), pages 489-538.
    6. Cornelia Kerl & Friederike Niepmann, 2014. "What determines the composition of international bank flows?," Staff Reports 681, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    7. Wang, Ruohan & Xue, Yi & Zheng, Wenping, 2021. "Does high external debt predict lower economic growth? Role of sovereign spreads and institutional quality," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
    8. Hartmann, Philipp & Hubrich, Kirstin & Kremer, Manfred & Tetlow, Robert J., 2013. "Melting down: Systemic financial instability and the macroeconomy," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 80487, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    9. Daniel Garcia-Macia & Alonso Villacorta, 2023. "Macroprudential Policy with Liquidity Panics," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 36(5), pages 2046-2090.
    10. Sebastian Krug & Matthias Lengnick & Hans-Werner Wohltmann, 2014. "The impact of Basel III on financial (in)stability: an agent-based credit network approach," Quantitative Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(12), pages 1917-1932, December.
    11. Chen, Guojin & Liu, Yanzhen & Zhang, Yu, 2021. "Systemic risk measures and distribution forecasting of macroeconomic shocks," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 178-196.
    12. Frédéric Boissay & Russell Cooper, 2014. "The Collateral Trap," NBER Working Papers 20703, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Agur, Itai, 2014. "Bank risk within and across equilibria," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 322-333.
    14. Panzera, Fabio S., 2011. "Price stability and financial imbalances: rethinking the macrofinancial framework after the 2007-8 financial crisis," FSES Working Papers 423, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Freiburg/Fribourg Switzerland.
    15. Bertsch, Christoph, 2013. "A detrimental feedback loop: deleveraging and adverse selection," Working Paper Series 277, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    asymmetric information; financial crisis; financial integration; global imbalances; moral hazard;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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