IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/eca/wpaper/2013-151200.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Identifying What is tempting

Author

Listed:
  • Alexander Groves

Abstract

An individual with present bias is one who is particularly impatient for consumption now at the expense of consumption later, but less impatient between any two dates in the future. A hypothesis for the cause of present bias is that immediate consumption is subject to temptation, whereas future consumption is not. Under this hypothesis an individual's level of present bias is a combination of what she is tempted to do and the amount of self-control she uses to avoid succumbing to this temptation. I show that given a level of present bias what is tempting and how much self-control is used is not always identified: it could be that she is tempted to consume everything she has available right now, but she controls herself; that her temptation is more mild and she succumbs to it completely; or something in between. I then present an algorithm that is able to disentangle this combination by eliciting the maximum price she will pay for commitment and her present bias. This works because for a given level of present-bias commitment becomes more valuable as the effort required to control one's self increases.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Groves, 2013. "Identifying What is tempting," Working Papers ECARES 2013-41, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  • Handle: RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/151200
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/151200/1/2013-41-GROVES-identifying.pdf
    File Function: 2013-41-GROVES-identifying
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John Ameriks & Andrew Caplin & John Leahy & Tom Tyler, 2007. "Measuring Self-Control Problems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 966-972, June.
    2. David K. Levine & Drew Fudenberg, 2006. "A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1449-1476, December.
    3. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2011. "Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 34-68, August.
    4. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2012. "Timing and Self‐Control," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 1-42, January.
    5. Thaler, Richard, 1981. "Some empirical evidence on dynamic inconsistency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 201-207.
    6. Stephan Meier & Charles Sprenger, 2010. "Present-Biased Preferences and Credit Card Borrowing," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 193-210, January.
    7. Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman & Aldo Rustichini, 2009. "Temptation-Driven Preferences," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(3), pages 937-971.
    8. , & ,, 2010. "Uphill self-control," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 5(2), May.
    9. Nava Ashraf & Dean Karlan & Wesley Yin, 2006. "Tying Odysseus to the Mast: Evidence From a Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 121(2), pages 635-672.
    10. Michal Bauer & Julie Chytilova & Jonathan Morduch, 2012. "Behavioral Foundations of Microcredit: Experimental and Survey Evidence from Rural India," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 1118-1139, April.
    11. John K.-H. Quah & Bruno Strulovici, 2013. "Discounting, Values, and Decisions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(5), pages 896-939.
    12. Noor, Jawwad, 2007. "Commitment and self-control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 1-34, July.
    13. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2004. "Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(1), pages 119-158, January.
    14. James Andreoni & Charles Sprenger, 2012. "Estimating Time Preferences from Convex Budgets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(7), pages 3333-3356, December.
    15. Alessandro Bucciol, 2012. "Measuring Self-Control Problems: A Structural Estimation," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 10(5), pages 1084-1115, October.
    16. Matthew Rabin, 2000. "Risk Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: A Calibration Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1281-1292, September.
    17. Maribeth Coller & Melonie Williams, 1999. "Eliciting Individual Discount Rates," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 2(2), pages 107-127, December.
    18. David Laibson, 1997. "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(2), pages 443-478.
    19. Per Krusell & Burhanettin Kuruşçu & Anthony A. Smith Jr., 2010. "Temptation and Taxation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(6), pages 2063-2084, November.
    20. Steffen Andersen & Glenn W. Harrison & Morten I. Lau & E. Elisabet Rutström, 2008. "Eliciting Risk and Time Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 583-618, May.
    21. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2001. "Temptation and Self-Control," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1403-1435, November.
    22. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2005. "The Revealed Preference Theory of Changing Tastes," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 72(2), pages 429-448.
    23. Martin Ahlbrecht & Martin Weber, 1997. "An Empirical Study on Intertemporal Decision Making Under Risk," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 43(6), pages 813-826, June.
    24. Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, 2002. "Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(2), pages 351-401, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Houser, Daniel & Schunk, Daniel & Winter, Joachim & Xiao, Erte, 2018. "Temptation and commitment in the laboratory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 329-344.
    2. Sebastian Vollmer & Juditha Wójcik, 2017. "The long-term consequences of the global 1918 influenza pandemic: A systematic analysis of 117 IPUMS international census data sets," Courant Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth - Discussion Papers 242, Courant Research Centre PEG.
    3. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2012. "Timing and Self‐Control," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 1-42, January.
    4. Bisin, Alberto & Hyndman, Kyle, 2020. "Present-bias, procrastination and deadlines in a field experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 339-357.
    5. James Andreoni & Charles Sprenger, 2012. "Estimating Time Preferences from Convex Budgets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(7), pages 3333-3356, December.
    6. Damon Jones & Aprajit Mahajan, 2015. "Time-Inconsistency and Saving: Experimental Evidence from Low-Income Tax Filers," NBER Working Papers 21272, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Jindrich Matousek & Tomas Havranek & Zuzana Irsova, 2022. "Individual discount rates: a meta-analysis of experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(1), pages 318-358, February.
    8. Pier-André Bouchard St-Amant & Jean-Denis Garon, 2015. "Optimal redistributive pensions and the cost of self-control," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 22(5), pages 723-740, October.
    9. Peysakhovich, Alexander, 2014. "How to commit (if you must): Commitment contracts and the dual-self model," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 100-112.
    10. Tran, Chung, 2018. "Temptation and taxation with elastic labor," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 351-369.
    11. Stephan Meier & Charles Sprenger, 2010. "Present-Biased Preferences and Credit Card Borrowing," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 193-210, January.
    12. Ubfal, Diego, 2016. "How general are time preferences? Eliciting good-specific discount rates," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 150-170.
    13. Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch, 2015. "Time Preferences and Bargaining," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /2015/568, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    14. Airaudo, Marco, 2020. "Temptation and forward-guidance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    15. Rudy Henkel, 2021. "Multiself Bargaining," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 9(1), pages 28-65, June.
    16. Carlsson, Fredrik & Yang, Xiaojun, 2013. "Intertemporal Choice Shifts in Households: Do they occur and are they good?," Working Papers in Economics 569, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    17. Barton L. Lipman & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2010. "Temptation," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2010-021, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    18. Bryan, Gharad & Karlan, Dean & Nelson, Scott, 2009. "Commitment Contracts," Working Papers 73, Yale University, Department of Economics.
    19. Stefano DellaVigna, 2009. "Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(2), pages 315-372, June.
    20. Huseynov, Samir & Palma, Marco A. & Ahmad, Ghufran, 2021. "Does the magnitude of relative calorie distance affect food consumption?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 188(C), pages 530-551.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D0 - Microeconomics - - General
    • D9 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/151200. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Benoit Pauwels (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/arulbbe.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.