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Trust and Reciprocity among International Groups: Experimental Evidence from Austria and Japan

  • Kenju Akai
  • Robert J. Netzer
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    TThis paper explores national identity in trust and reciprocity at theintra- and international levels by adopting a modified trust game played among groups from Austria and Japan, in which subjects play the roles of trustor and trustee consecutively without any information feedback. Intra- and international trust levels are identical across nationalities. Intranational reciprocity in Austria is greater than in Japan, but there is no significant difference in international reciprocity between the two countries. We also examine the relationship between trust and reciprocity and the relathionship between trust/reciprocity andexpectations, demographic variables, the individualism index, and trust indices.International trust enhances international reciprocity in both countries, although this effect is weaker in Japan than in Austria. Expected returns enhance trust in both countries at the intra- and international levels. In Japan, expected transfers enhance international reciprocity less than they do intranational reciprocity. A larger number of females in the group reduce international trust. In Austria, this reduces international trust more than it does intranational trust.

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    Paper provided by Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University in its series ISER Discussion Paper with number 0737r.

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    Date of creation: May 2009
    Date of revision: Aug 2010
    Handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0737r
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