The Outsider and Sunk Cost Effects on 'Dango' in Public Procurement Bidding: An Experimental Analysis
This paper presents the result of experiments for finding some insight into an effect of the new bidding system in Japanese public construction works procurement on bidders' collusion, which is called 'dango'. We focused on an effect of the entry of an outsider who is not a dango member. The main conclusion of the experiments is that an outsider, a subject who is not allowed to communicate with other subjects, has a robust effect to prevent other subjects from colluding and to make the winning price decrease considerably.
|Date of creation:||2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047|
Web page: http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/index-e.html
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- McKelvey, Richard D & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1992. "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 803-36, July.
- John McMillan, 1991. "Dango: Japan'S Price-Fixing Conspiracies," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(3), pages 201-218, November.
- Davis, Douglas D & Holt, Charles A, 1998. "Conspiracies and Secret Discounts in Laboratory Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(448), pages 736-56, May.
- Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982.
"Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
- David Kreps & Paul Milgrom & John Roberts & Bob Wilson, 2010. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Levine's Working Paper Archive 239, David K. Levine.
- McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1992.
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 579-99, June.
- Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Une, Masashi & Yamaguchi, Toru, 1996.
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies,
Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 1-11, March.
- Isaac, R. Mark & Ramey, Valerie & Williams, Arlington W., 1984. "The effects of market organization on conspiracies in restraint of trade," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 191-222, June.
- Isaac, R. Mark & Walker, James M., 1985. "Information and conspiracy in sealed bid auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 139-159, June.
- Douglas D. Davis & Charles A. Holt, 1994. "Market Power and Mergers in Laboratory Markets with Posted Prices," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(3), pages 467-487, Autumn.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0514. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Fumiko Matsumoto)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.