Common Knowledge of Summary Statistics
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References listed on IDEAS
- Bacharach, Michael, 1985. "Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 167-190, October.
- McKelvey, Richard D & Page, Talbot, 1986. "Common Knowledge, Consensus, and Aggregate Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(1), pages 109-127, January.
- Cave, Jonathan A. K., 1983. "Learning to agree," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 147-152.
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Keywords
Common knowledge; public opinion; group behavior;All these keywords.
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