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Transaction costs and pharmaceutical clinical research: a Data Envelopment Analysis approach




Taking human experimentation into account, this work aims at estimating the relationship between transaction costs, which are related to the protection system of patients’ rights, and localization of pharmaceutical industry’s testing phase. Assuming that the competitiveness of the protection system is based on the time required to obtain an authorization or an experimental activity, pharmaceutical clinical research should be positively affected by a process aimed at internalizing the review process, if efficient. By analyzing said system with operational research, this paper concludes suggesting the potentiality of a competitive system of reviewers, that is to say, the efficiency of that internalization process is performed by medical centers in which the experimental treatments are proposed to subjects.

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  • Greta Falavigna & Roberto Ippoliti, 2012. "Transaction costs and pharmaceutical clinical research: a Data Envelopment Analysis approach," CERIS Working Paper 201204, Institute for Economic Research on Firms and Growth - Moncalieri (TO) ITALY -NOW- Research Institute on Sustainable Economic Growth - Moncalieri (TO) ITALY.
  • Handle: RePEc:csc:cerisp:201204

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Coase, R H, 1988. "The Nature of the Firm: Influence," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 33-47, Spring.
    2. Charnes, A. & Cooper, W. W. & Rhodes, E., 1978. "Measuring the efficiency of decision making units," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 2(6), pages 429-444, November.
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    JEL classification:

    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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