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Preemption and Rent Dissipation under Bertrand Competition

Author

Listed:
  • Marcel Boyer

    (Université de Montréal and CIRANO)

  • Pierre Lasserre

    (Economics Department, UQAM, GREQAM and CIRANO)

  • Thomas Mariotti

    (London School of Economics and Political Science, GREMAQ and Université de Toulouse I)

  • Michel Moreaux

    (Institut Universitaire de France, Université de Toulouse I, IDEI and LEERNA)

Abstract

We study a simple duopoly model of preemption with multiple investments and instantaneous Bertrand competition on a market of finite size driven by stochastic taste shocks. Different patterns of equilibria may arise, depending on the importance of the real option effect. If the average growth rate of the market is close to the risk free rate, or if the volatility of demand shocks is high, no dissipation of rents occur in equilibrium, despite instantaneous Bertrand competition. If these conditions do not hold, the equilibrium investment timing is suboptimal, and the firms' long-run capacities may depend on the initial market conditions. Our conclusions contrast sharply with standard rent dissipation results.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcel Boyer & Pierre Lasserre & Thomas Mariotti & Michel Moreaux, 2001. "Preemption and Rent Dissipation under Bertrand Competition," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 20-04, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
    • Handle: RePEc:cre:uqamwp:20-04
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    11. Katz, Michael L & Shapiro, Carl, 1987. "R&D Rivalry with Licensing or Imitation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 402-420, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Boyer, Marcel & Lasserre, Pierre & Moreaux, Michel, 2012. "A dynamic duopoly investment game without commitment under uncertain market expansion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 663-681.
    2. Jean-Pierre Ponssard, 2004. "Rent Dissipation in Repeated Entry Games: Some New Results," CESifo Working Paper Series 1186, CESifo.
    3. Boyer, Marcel & Lasserre, Pierre & Moreaux, Michel, 2010. "A Dynamic Duopoly Investment Game under Uncertain Market Growth," TSE Working Papers 10-171, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    4. Lambrecht, Bart & Perraudin, William, 2003. "Real options and preemption under incomplete information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 619-643, February.
    5. Boyer, Marcel & Robert, Jacques, 2006. "Organizational inertia and dynamic incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 324-348, March.
    6. Marcel Boyer, 2010. "The Measure and Regulation of Competition in Telecommunications Markets," Chapters, in: Anastassios Gentzoglanis & Anders Henten (ed.), Regulation and the Evolution of the Global Telecommunications Industry, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Marcel Boyer & Pierre Lasserre & Michel Moreaux, 2007. "The Dynamics of Industry Investments," CIRANO Working Papers 2007s-09, CIRANO.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Preemption; rent dissipation; lumpy investment; real options;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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