Measuring the Impact Factor of Agents within an Organization Using Communication Patterns
Organizational economics predicts that communication patterns within an organization should reflect the relative value of their members to the organization. We propose to measure the impact factor of an agent by applying the Invariant Method–also known as Google’s PageRank algorithm–to electronic communication data. To explore the validity of this measure, we analyze email exchanges among the top executives of a large retail company. We construct their individual impact factors based only on email patterns and we compare them to standard economic measures of organizational importance. We find that: (i) The impact-factor ranking of executives mirrors perfectly their hierarchical ranking; (ii) Impact factor variability is significantly correlated with salary differences; (iii) Subsequent promotions (dismissals) affect executives with unusually high (low) impact factors. We conclude that simple communication-based impact factors may be a useful tool to measure the relative importance of agents in organizations.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.|
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
|Order Information:|| Email: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Bolton, 1996.
"The firm as a communication network,"
ULB Institutional Repository
2013/9597, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Bolton, 1994. "The firm as a communication network," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9595, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Bolton, 2004. "The firm as a communication network," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9599, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Luis Garicano, 2000. "Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 874-904, October.
- Andrea Prat, 2002.
"The wrong kind of transparency,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
3679, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Andrea Prat, 2004. "The wrong kind of transparency," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24712, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Andrea Prat, 2002. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 439, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Prat, Andrea, 2003. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," CEPR Discussion Papers 3859, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jacques Cremer & Luis Garicano & Andrea Prat, 2006.
"Language and the Theory of the Firm,"
784828000000000373, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Radner, Roy, 1993. "The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1109-46, September.
- Wouter Dessein & Tano Santos, 2006. "Adaptive Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(5), pages 956-985, October.
- Timothy Van Zandt, 2004.
"Information Overload in a Network of Targeted Communication,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(3), pages 542-560, Autumn.
- Van Zandt, Timothy, 2001. "Information Overload in a Network of Targeted Communication," CEPR Discussion Papers 2836, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ignacio Palacios-Huerta & Oscar Volij, 2004.
"The Measurement of Intellectual Influence,"
Econometric Society, vol. 72(3), pages 963-977, 05.
- Volij, Oscar & Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio, 2004. "The Measurment of Intellectual Influence," Staff General Research Papers Archive 10797, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Ignacio Palacios-Huerta & Oscar Volij, 2002. "The Measurement of Intellectual Influence," Economic theory and game theory 015, Oscar Volij.
- Timothy van Zandt, 1999. "Real-Time Decentralized Information Processing as a Model of Organizations with Boundedly Rational Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(3), pages 633-658.
- Raymond Fisman & Sheena S. Iyengar & Emir Kamenica & Itamar Simonson, 2006. "Gender Differences in Mate Selection: Evidence From a Speed Dating Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 121(2), pages 673-697.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8040. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.