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Social Insurance, Education, and Work Ethics

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  • Gradstein, Mark

Abstract

This research shows that moral hazard associated with extant social insurance arrangements causes underinvestment in human capital, because of government?s inability to commit to welfare policies. It then argues that education policies, such as education subsidies or direct public investment in education, may achieve a second best and also help alleviating the deterioration of work norms.

Suggested Citation

  • Gradstein, Mark, 2010. "Social Insurance, Education, and Work Ethics," CEPR Discussion Papers 7838, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7838
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Heckman, James J. & Jacobs, Bas, 2009. "Policies to Create and Destroy Human Capital in Europe," IZA Discussion Papers 4680, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Gradstein, Mark & Kaganovich, Michael, 2004. "Aging population and education finance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2469-2485, December.
    3. Alberto Alesina & Edward Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote, 2005. "Work and Leisure in the U. S. and Europe: Why so Different?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2068, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    4. Dan Anderberg & Alessandro Balestrino, 2003. "Self--enforcing Intergenerational Transfers and the Provision of Education," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 70(277), pages 55-71, February.
    5. Edward C. Prescott, 2004. "Why do Americans work so much more than Europeans?," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 28(Jul), pages 2-13.
    6. Lans Bovenberg, A. & Jacobs, Bas, 2005. "Redistribution and education subsidies are Siamese twins," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(11-12), pages 2005-2035, December.
    7. Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg, 2006. "Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms, and Social Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 121(4), pages 1473-1503.
    8. Lindbeck, Assar, 1995. "Hazardous Welfare-State Dynamics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 9-15, May.
    9. repec:hhs:iuiwop:557 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Barr, Nicholas, 2004. "Economics of the Welfare State," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, edition 4, number 9780199264971.
    11. Andersson, Fredrik & Konrad, Kai A., 2003. "Human capital investment and globalization in extortionary states," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1539-1555, August.
    12. Gradstein, Mark, 2000. "An economic rationale for public education: The value of commitment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 463-474, April.
    13. Bohacek, Radim & Kapicka, Marek, 2008. "Optimal human capital policies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 1-16, January.
    14. Alexander Haupt & Eckhard Janeba, 2009. "Education, redistribution and the threat of brain drain," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 16(1), pages 1-24, February.
    15. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    16. Anderberg, Dan & Andersson, Fredrik, 2003. "Investments in human capital, wage uncertainty, and public policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1521-1537, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Giacomo Corneo, 2012. "Work Norms and the Welfare State," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 58(4), pages 599-625, December.
    2. Corneo, Giacomo, 2013. "Work norms, social insurance and the allocation of talent," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 79-92.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Education policies; Moral hazard; Social insurance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid

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