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Penalty Shoot-Outs: Before or After Extra Time?


  • Carrillo, Juan D


This paper proposes a rule to determine the winner of a soccer match which is different from the traditional penalty shoot-outs at the end of extra time. We show that games can be more attractive if penalties are shot before extra time and the outcome counts only if the tie is preserved during extra time. In general, this rule will promote offense by the team that loses the penalty shoot-outs and it will promote defense by the team that wins the penalty shoot-outs. We provide conditions on the marginal effect of offensive play in the probabilities of scoring and conceding a goal such that the proposed rule dominates the current one. Last, we determine a class of functions that satisfies these conditions. More generally, the paper shows how the ordering of tasks may affect the incentives to exert and allocate effort.

Suggested Citation

  • Carrillo, Juan D, 2006. "Penalty Shoot-Outs: Before or After Extra Time?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5579, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5579

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    2. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
    3. Palomino, F.A. & Rigotti, L. & Rustichini, A., 1998. "Skill, Strategy and Passion : An Empirical Analysis of Soccer," Discussion Paper 1998-129, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    4. Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, 2003. "Professionals Play Minimax," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(2), pages 395-415.
    5. Mark Walker & John Wooders, 2001. "Minimax Play at Wimbledon," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1521-1538, December.
    6. P.-A. Chiappori, 2002. "Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1138-1151, September.
    7. Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio, 1999. "The Aversion to the Sequential Resolution of Uncertainty," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 249-269, October.
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    More about this item


    effort allocation; implicit incentives; sports economics;

    JEL classification:

    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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