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The Aversion to the Sequential Resolution of Uncertainty

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  • Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio

Abstract

This paper sets forth and offers an explanation for preferences for the form of the timing of resolution of uncertainty: namely for uncertainty to be resolved all at one time rather than sequentially. The explanation is based on a weakening of the independence axiom, in particular on the notion of disappointment aversion developed in Gul's (1991) axiomatic model of preferences. Implications of this aversion are discussed for issues in finance, intertemporal decision making under uncertainty, high stakes risky situations and consumer self-regulation. The analysis encourages a formulation of preferences over all attributes of interest to the decision maker, including psychological satisfaction. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio, 1999. "The Aversion to the Sequential Resolution of Uncertainty," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 249-269, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:18:y:1999:i:3:p:249-69
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    Cited by:

    1. Hsiaw, Alice, 2018. "Goal bracketing and self-control," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 100-121.
    2. Florian Zimmermann, 2015. "Clumped or Piecewise? Evidence on Preferences for Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(4), pages 740-753, April.
    3. Johannes Buckenmaier & Eugen Dimant & Ann-Christin Posten & Ulrich Schmidt, 2021. "Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 177-201, April.
    4. Marianne Andries & Valentin Haddad, 2020. "Information Aversion," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(5), pages 1901-1939.
    5. Thomas Epper & Helga Fehr-Duda, 2012. "The missing link: unifying risk taking and time discounting," ECON - Working Papers 096, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Oct 2018.
    6. Li, Jian, 2020. "Preferences for partial information and ambiguity," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
    7. Epper, Thomas & Fehr-Duda, Helga, 2017. "A Tale of Two Tails: On the Coexistence of Overweighting and Underweighting of Rare Extreme Events," Economics Working Paper Series 1705, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
    8. Dillenberger, David, 2008. "Preferences for One-Shot Resolution of Uncertainty and Allais-Type Behavior," MPRA Paper 8342, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Bernasconi, Michele & Bernhofer, Juliana, 2020. "Catch Me If You Can: Testing the reduction of compound lotteries axiom in a tax compliance experiment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    10. Tim Pawlowski & Dooruj Rambaccussing & Philip Ramirez & James & Giambattista Rossi, 2023. "Exploring Entertainment Utility from Football Games," Economics Discussion Papers em-dp2023-13, Department of Economics, University of Reading.
    11. Nielsen, Kirby, 2020. "Preferences for the resolution of uncertainty and the timing of information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    12. Russell Golman & David Hagmann & George Loewenstein, 2017. "Information Avoidance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 55(1), pages 96-135, March.
    13. Juan D. Carrillo, 2007. "Penalty Shoot-Outs," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 8(5), pages 505-518, October.
    14. David Dillenberger, 2008. "Preferences for One-Shot Resolution of Uncertainty and Allais-Type Behavior," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-036, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    15. Carrillo, Juan, 2006. "Penalty Shoot-Outs: Before or After Extra Time?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5579, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernán González, 2023. "On The Appeal Of Complexity," Working Papers 2312, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.

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