Increasing the reliability of electricity production: a cost-benefit analysis
This report analyses three instruments aimed at increasing the reliability of electricity production. Read also the accompanying press release and Special Publication ' Energy policies and risks on energy markets; a cost-benefit analysis '. In the system of capacity markets, the transmission system operator (TSO) requires traders to back their own peak load plus a prescribed level of spare capacity with contracted capacity, the latter being tradable at secondary markets. With reserve contracts, the TSO contracts spare capacity from producers, holding it to be dispatched in case of a crisis. Capacity payments are a subsidy on capital costs, giving producers an incentive to build more capacity. These measures prove to be inefficient in preventing price spikes, as the welfare costs of price spikes are lower than the costs of the policy options unless price spikes occur in an implausibly high frequency. Capacity payments cannot prevent black-outs, as they do not induce enough investments in spare capacity. Black-outs can be prevented by capacity markets and reserve contracts, but at a high cost. Even if a 24-hour black-out of the Randstad area occurred every five years, it would be cheaper to accept the consequences of the black-out than to prevent it.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2004|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Postbus 80510, 2508 GM Den Haag|
Phone: (070) 338 33 80
Fax: (070) 338 33 50
Web page: http://www.cpb.nl/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Pablo Serra & Gabriel Fierro, 1996.
"Outage Cost in Chilean Industry,"
Documentos de Trabajo
10, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Joskow, Paul L & Tirole, Jean, 1999. "Transmission Rights and Market Power on Electric Power Networks I: Financial Rights," CEPR Discussion Papers 2093, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Machiel Mulder & S. Speck, 2003. "Competition on European energy markets: between policy ambitions and practical restrictions," CPB Document 33, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
- Ford, Andrew, 1999. "Cycles in competitive electricity markets: a simulation study of the western United States," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(11), pages 637-658, October.
- David F. Layton & Klaus Moeltner, 2000.
"A Censored Random Coefficients Model for Pooled Survey Data with Application to the Estimation of Power Outage Costs,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
0912, Econometric Society.
- Klaus Moeltner & David F. Layton, 2002. "A Censored Random Coefficients Model For Pooled Survey Data With Application To The Estimation Of Power Outage Costs," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 552-561, August.
- Jeroen de Joode & Douwe Kingma & Mark Lijesen, 2004. "Energy policies and risks on energy markets; a cost-benefit analysis," CPB Special Publication 51, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
- Tishler, Asher, 1993. "Optimal production with uncertain interruptions in the supply of electricity : Estimation of electricity outage costs," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 1259-1274, August.
- Richard Green, 2005. "Electricity and Markets," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(1), pages 67-87, Spring.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpb:docmnt:52. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.