Vertical integration and exclusive vertical restraints in health-care markets
We examine vertical integration and exclusive vertical restraints in health-care markets where insurers and hospitals bilaterally bargain over contracts. We employ a bargaining model in a concentrated health-care market of two hospitals and two health insurers competing on premiums. Without vertical integration, some bilateral contracts will not be concluded only if hospitals are sufficiently differentiated, whereas with vertical integration we find that a breakdown of a contract will always occur. There may be two reasons for not concluding a contract. First, hospitals maychoose to soften competition by contracting only one insurer in the market. Second, insurers and hospitals may choose to increase product differentiation by contracting asymmetric hospital networks. Both types raise total industry profits and lower consumer welfare.
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- de Fontenay, Catherine C. & Gans, Joshua S. & Groves, Vivienne, 2010. "Exclusivity, competition and the irrelevance of internal investment," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 336-340, July.
- Catherine C. de Fontenay & Joshua S. Gans, 2004.
"Vertical Integration in the Presence of Upstream Competition,"
Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
904, The University of Melbourne.
- Catherine C. de Fontenay & Joshua S. Gans, 2005. "Vertical Integration in the Presence of Upstream Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(3), pages 544-572, Autumn.
- Joshua Gans & Catherine de Fontenay, 2004. "Vertical Integration in the Presence of Upstream Competition," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 7, Econometric Society.
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