Equilibrium Selection in Sequential Games with Imperfect Information
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- Jon X. Eguia & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Rebecca Morton & Antonio Nicolò, 2014. "Equilibrium Selection in Sequential Games with Imperfect Information," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_04, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Jeanine Miklós-Thal & Greg Shaffer, 2016. "Naked Exclusion with Private Offers," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 174-194, November.
- Moellers, Claudia & Normann, Hans-Theo & Snyder, Christopher M., 2017. "Communication in vertical markets: Experimental evidence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 214-258.
- Möllers, Claudia & Normann, Hans-Theo & Snyder, Christopher M., 2016. "Communication in vertical markets: Experimental evidence," DICE Discussion Papers 226, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Normann, Hans-Theo & Möllers, Claudia & Snyder, Christopher M., 2015. "Communication in Vertically Related Markets: Experimental Evidence," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112842, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Maria Carmela Ceparano & Jacqueline Morgan, 2015. "Equilibria Under Passive Beliefs for Multi-leader-follower Games with Vertical Information: Existence Results," CSEF Working Papers 417, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 09 Jan 2017.
- Claudia Möllers & Hans-Theo Normann & Christopher M. Snyder, 2016. "Communication in Vertical Markets: Experimental Evidence," NBER Working Papers 22219, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
More about this item
KeywordsEquilibrium selection; Passive beliefs; Symmetric beliefs; Vertical contracting; Multiple equilibria; Imperfect information;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-04-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2014-04-18 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CTA-2014-04-18 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EXP-2014-04-18 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2014-04-18 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2014-04-18 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2014-04-18 (Microeconomics)
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