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Transfer pricing and enforcement policy in oligopolistic markets

  • AMERIGHI, Oscar

In this paper we set up a symmetric two-country model with trade costs and international ownership to study the transfer pricing decisions by two multinationals operating in markets with Cournot competition. We let governments choose both the corporate profit tax rate and the level of enforcement of the "arm's length" principle and we examine how enforcement policies affect the tax competition game. Furthermore, we analyze in what direction economic integration, in terms of a reduction in trade costs and/or a larger international ownership of multinationals, influences the symmetric equilibrium level of the two policy instruments. We show that increased economic integration may lead to higher equilibrium tax rates, and that, as governments increase the level of enforcement, equilibrium tax rates increase as well. Moreover, we find that, when the two MNEs are not fully owned by domestic residents, trade liberalization decreases the equilibrium enforcement policy, while increased international ownership increases the level of enforcement.

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2004069.

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Date of creation: 00 Oct 2004
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2004069
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  1. Kashif S. Mansori & Alfons J. Weichenrieder, 2001. "Tax Competition and Transfer Pricing Disputes," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 58(1), pages 1-, December.
  2. Hines, James R, Jr & Rice, Eric M, 1994. "Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and American Business," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(1), pages 149-82, February.
  3. Kant, Chander, 1988. "Endogenous transfer pricing and the effects of uncertain regulation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 147-157, February.
  4. Michael Keen, 1993. "The welfare economics of tax co-ordination in the European Community : a survey," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 14(2), pages 15-36, February.
  5. Huizinga, Harry & Nielsen, Soren Bo, 1997. "Capital income and profit taxation with foreign ownership of firms," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 149-165, February.
  6. Kind, Hans Jarle & Schjelderup, Guttorm & Ulltveit-Moe, Karen-Helene, 2001. "Corporate Taxation, Multinational Enterprise and Economic Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 2753, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Bartelsman, Eric J & Beetsma, Roel, 2000. "Why Pay More? Corporate Tax Avoidance Through Transfer Pricing in OECD Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 2543, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Ludema, Rodney D. & Wooton, Ian, 2000. "Economic geography and the fiscal effects of regional integration," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 331-357, December.
  9. Roger H. Gordon & James R. Hines Jr., 2002. "International Taxation," NBER Working Papers 8854, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Kind, Hans Jarle & Schjelderup, Guttorm & Ulltveit-Moe, Karen-Helene, 2004. "Trade and Multinationals: The Effect of Economic Integration on Taxation and Tax Revenue," CEPR Discussion Papers 4312, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Richard E. Baldwin & Paul Krugman, 2002. "Agglomeration, Integration and Tax Harmonization," NBER Working Papers 9290, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-73857 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Hans Jarle Kind & Helene Midelfart & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2004. "Corporate Tax Systems, Multinational Enterprises, and Economic Integration," CESifo Working Paper Series 1241, CESifo Group Munich.
  14. Huizinga, Harry & Nicodème, Gaëtan, 2003. "Foreign Ownership and Corporate Income Taxation: An Empirical Evaluation," CEPR Discussion Papers 3952, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Alberto Giovannini & R. Glenn Hubbard & Joel Slemrod, 1993. "Studies in International Taxation," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number giov93-1, December.
  16. Haufler, Andreas & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2000. "Corporate tax systems and cross country profit shifting," Munich Reprints in Economics 20419, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  17. James R. Markusen, 2004. "Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262633078, June.
  18. Elitzur, Ramy & Mintz, Jack, 1996. "Transfer pricing rules and corporate tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 401-422, June.
  19. Jenkins, Glenn P & Wright, Brian D, 1975. "Taxation of Income of Multinational Corporations: The Case of the United States Petroleum Industry," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 57(1), pages 1-11, February.
  20. Xavier WAUTHY & Susana PERALTA & Tanguy VAN YPERSELE, . "Should Countries Control International Profit Shifting?," EcoMod2004 330600158, EcoMod.
  21. David Harris & Randall Morck & Joel Slemrod & Bernard Yeung, 1991. "Income Shifting in U.S. Multinational Corporations," NBER Working Papers 3924, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Harry Grubert & Timothy Goodspeed & Deborah L. Swenson, 1993. "Explaining the Low Taxable Income of Foreign-Controlled Companies in the United States," NBER Chapters, in: Studies in International Taxation, pages 237-276 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  23. Grubert, Harry & Mutti, John, 1991. "Taxes, Tariffs and Transfer Pricing in Multinational Corporate Decision Making," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 73(2), pages 285-93, May.
  24. Kind, Hans Jarle & Schjelderup, Guttorm & Ulltveit-Moe, Karen-Helene, 2002. "Why Corporate Taxes May Rise: The Case of Trade Liberalization and Foreign Ownership," CEPR Discussion Papers 3383, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  25. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 269-304, June.
  26. Hines, James R. Jr., 1999. "Lessons from Behavioral Responses to International Taxation," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 305-22, June.
  27. Clausing, Kimberly A., 2003. "Tax-motivated transfer pricing and US intrafirm trade prices," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 2207-2223, September.
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