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Tax Competition and Transfer Pricing Disputes

Author

Listed:
  • Kashif S. Mansori
  • Alfons J. Weichenrieder

Abstract

In the U.S., transfer-pricing regulations, which are designed to limit multinationals' profit shift activities, have been tightened in recent years. The new regulations have been enacted in response to concerns that foreign companies are not contributing adequate tax revenues. Against this background, the paper examines the implications of competing governments who maximize tax revenues from multinational firms and use transfer-pricing regulations as strategic variables. The result is a non-cooperative equilibrium that implies a double taxation of corporate profits and a depressed level of international trade. Cooperation between governments could potentially increase both tax revenues and trade.

Suggested Citation

  • Kashif S. Mansori & Alfons J. Weichenrieder, 2001. "Tax Competition and Transfer Pricing Disputes," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 58(1), pages 1-1, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(200112)58:1_1:tcatpd_2.0.tx_2-4
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kristian Behrens & Susana Peralt & Pierre M. Picard, 2014. "Transfer Pricing Rules, OECD Guidelines, and Market Distortions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(4), pages 650-680, August.
    2. Kind, Hans Jarle & Schjelderup, Guttorm & Ulltveit-Moe, Karen-Helene, 2002. "Why Corporate Taxes May Rise: The Case of Trade Liberalization and Foreign Ownership," CEPR Discussion Papers 3383, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Peralta, Susana & Wauthy, Xavier & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2006. "Should countries control international profit shifting?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 24-37, January.
    4. Sven Stöwhase, 2005. "Asymmetric Capital Tax Competition with Profit Shifting," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 85(2), pages 175-196, August.
    5. Kind, Hans Jarle & Midelfart, Karen Helene & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2005. "Corporate tax systems, multinational enterprises, and economic integration," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 507-521, March.
    6. Alfons Weichenrieder, 2009. "Profit shifting in the EU: evidence from Germany," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 16(3), pages 281-297, June.
    7. Bartelsman, Eric J. & Beetsma, Roel M. W. J., 2003. "Why pay more? Corporate tax avoidance through transfer pricing in OECD countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 2225-2252, September.
    8. Johannes Becker & Ronald B. Davies, 2014. "A Negotiation-Based Model of Tax-Induced Transfer Pricing," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp451, IIIS.
    9. Wolfgang Eggert & Jun-Ichi Itaya, 2014. "Tax Rate Harmonization, Renegotiation, and Asymmetric Tax Competition for Profits with Repeated Interaction," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(5), pages 796-823, October.
    10. Wellisch Dietmar, 2003. "Internationale Verrechnungspreismethoden, Neutralität und die Gewinne multinationaler Unternehmen / Transfer Pricing, Neutrality, and the Profits of Multinational Firms," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 223(3), pages 332-359, June.
    11. Wellisch Dietmar, 2003. "Internationale Verrechnungspreismethoden, Neutralität und die Gewinne multinationaler Unternehmen / Transfer Pricing, Neutrality, and the Profits of Multinational Firms," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 223(4), pages 464-478, August.
    12. AMERIGHI, Oscar, 2004. "Transfer pricing and enforcement policy in oligopolistic markets," CORE Discussion Papers 2004069, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    13. Amerighi, Oscar & Peralta, Susana, 2010. "The proximity-concentration trade-off with profit shifting," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 90-101, July.
    14. Sven Stöwhase, 2013. "How Profit Shifting May Increase the Tax Burden of Multinationals: A Simple Model with Discrete Investment Choices," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(2), pages 185-207, April.
    15. Kind, Hans Jarle & Schjelderup, Guttorm & Ulltveit-Moe, Karen-Helene, 2004. "Trade and Multinationals: The Effect of Economic Integration on Taxation and Tax Revenue," CEPR Discussion Papers 4312, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Kind, Hans Jarle & Schjelderup, Guttorm & Ulltveit-Moe, Karen-Helene, 2001. "Corporate Taxation, Multinational Enterprise and Economic Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 2753, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation

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