Protocol, Payoff, and Equilibrium: Game Theory and Social Modelling
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- Reinhard Selten, 1974. "Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games," Working Papers 023, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
- John G. Riley, 1976.
UCLA Economics Working Papers
071, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Plott, Charles R, 1982.
"Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 1485-1527, December.
- Plott, Charles R., . "Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics," Working Papers 405, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Robert J Aumann, 1999. "Agreeing to Disagree," Levine's Working Paper Archive 512, David K. Levine.
- Jack Hirshleifer, 1983. "From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 371-386, January.
- Smith, Vernon L, 1982. "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 923-55, December.
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