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Strategic Tournaments

  • Ayala Arad
  • Ariel Rubinstein

A strategic (round-robin) tournament is a simultaneous n-player game built on top of a symmetric two-player game G. Each player chooses one action in G and is matched to play G against all other players. The winner of the tournament is the player who achieves the highest total G-payoff. The tournament has several interpretations as an evolutionary model, as a model of social interaction, and as a model of competition between firms with procedurally rational consumers. We prove some general properties of the model and explore the intuition that a tournament encourages riskier behavior

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 786969000000000438.

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Date of creation: 11 May 2012
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:786969000000000438
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

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  1. Groh, Christian & Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner & Sunde, Uwe, 2012. "Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments," Munich Reprints in Economics 20441, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  2. Gilbert Laffond & Jean-François Laslier & Michel Breton, 2000. "K–Player Additive Extension of Two-Player games with an Application to the Borda Electoral Competition Game," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 129-137, March.
  3. Dekel, E. & Scotchmer, S., 1999. "On the Evolution of Attitudes Towards Risk in Winner-Take-All Games," Papers 4-99, Tel Aviv.
  4. Arad Ayala, 2012. "The Tennis Coach Problem: A Game-Theoretic and Experimental Study," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-43, April.
  5. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December.
  6. Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603, March.
  7. Jerry R. Green & Nancy L. Stokey, 1982. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0840, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-64, October.
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