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On the Pragmatics of Persuasion: A Game Theoretical Approach

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  • Jacob Glazer
  • Ariel Rubinstein

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  • Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "On the Pragmatics of Persuasion: A Game Theoretical Approach," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000166, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000166
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    File URL: http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/papers/persuasion05.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lipman Barton L. & Seppi Duane J., 1995. "Robust Inference in Communication Games with Partial Provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 370-405, August.
    2. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2007. "Hard evidence and mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 75-93, January.
    3. Rubinstein,Ariel, 2000. "Economics and Language," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521789905.
    4. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
    5. Jerry R. Green & Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1986. "Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(3), pages 447-456.
    6. Shin Hyun Song, 1994. "The Burden of Proof in a Game of Persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 253-264, October.
    7. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1986. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, Spring.
    8. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    9. Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, 1990. "The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(2), pages 427-444.
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    Cited by:

    1. Weiguo Zhang & Gilles Grenier, 2012. "How can Language be linked to Economics? A Survey of Two Strands of Research," Working Papers 1206E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.

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