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Policy Uncertainty, Electoral Securities and Redistribution


  • Andrea Mattozzi


This article investigates how uncertainty about the adoption of a redistribution policy affects political support for redistribution when individuals can trade policy-contingent securities in the stock market. In equilibrium the support for redistribution is smaller than where no "policy-insurance market" is available. This implies that in economies with well-developed financial markets redistribution decreases with the level of participation in these markets and with income inequality. Furthermore, the existence of a policy-insurance market may lead to a less equal distribution of income than where no insurance is available even if a majority of individuals are redistributing resources through private transfers. Copyright (2010) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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  • Andrea Mattozzi, 2003. "Policy Uncertainty, Electoral Securities and Redistribution," Levine's Working Paper Archive 666156000000000260, David K. Levine.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:666156000000000260

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    Cited by:

    1. Michael M. Bechtel & Roland Füss, 2010. "Capitalizing on Partisan Politics? The Political Economy of Sector-Specific Redistribution in Germany," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(2-3), pages 203-235, March.
    2. Agustin Casas & Yarine Fawaz & Andre Trindade, 2016. "Surprise Me If You Can: The Influence Of Newspaper Endorsements In U.S. Presidential Elections," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(3), pages 1484-1498, July.
    3. Knight*, Brian, 2007. "Are policy platforms capitalized into equity prices? Evidence from the Bush/Gore 2000 Presidential Election," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1-2), pages 389-409, February.
    4. Casas, Agustin & Fawaz, Yarine & Trindade, Andre, 2014. "Surprise me if you can: influence of newspaper endorsements in US Presidential elections," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1416, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    5. Jha, Saumitra, 2011. "Sharing the Future: Financial Innovation and Innovators in Solving the Political Economy Challenges of Development," Research Papers 2093, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.

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