Policy Uncertainty, Electoral Securities, And Redistribution
This article investigates how uncertainty about the adoption of a redistribution policy affects political support for redistribution when individuals can trade policy-contingent securities in the stock market. In equilibrium the support for redistribution is smaller than where no "policy-insurance market" is available. This implies that in economies with well-developed financial markets redistribution decreases with the level of participation in these markets and with income inequality. Furthermore, the existence of a policy-insurance market may lead to a less equal distribution of income than where no insurance is available even if a majority of individuals are redistributing resources through private transfers. Copyright (2010) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Volume (Year): 51 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
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