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Analyse économique des marchés publics dans l’industrie de la construction au Québec

Listed author(s):
  • Stéphanie Boulenger
  • Marcelin Joanis

Cette étude s’intéresse aux conditions favorisant la concurrence dans l’octroi et la gestion des contrats publics dans l’industrie de la construction, particulièrement aux procédures d’attribution des contrats publics et aux effets de l’ouverture des marchés sur l’incidence de la collusion. Elle s’appuie sur la théorie économique, une revue de la littérature en sciences économiques, une recension d’expériences hors Québec, et une analyse de données. Quatre grands thèmes sont abordés : des éléments d’analyse économique des marchés publics, les marchés publics au Québec, les procédures d’attribution des contrats dans le contexte des marchés publics et les effets de l’ouverture des marchés sur la collusion dans le domaine de la construction. Le rapport se termine par une réflexion sur de possibles réformes des marchés publics québécois.

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File URL: http://www.cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2015RP-23.pdf
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Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Project Reports with number 2015rp-23.

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Length: 124 pages
Date of creation: 07 Dec 2015
Handle: RePEc:cir:cirpro:2015rp-23
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  1. Patrick Sik-Wah Fong & Sonia Kit-Yung Choi, 2000. "Final contractor selection using the analytical hierarchy process," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(5), pages 547-557.
  2. Klein, Gordon J., 2010. "Cartel destabilization and leniency programs: Empirical evidence," ZEW Discussion Papers 10-107, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  3. Brenner, Steffen, 2009. "An empirical study of the European corporate leniency program," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 639-645, November.
  4. Marcelin Joanis & Youri Chassin & Lydia Yakonowsky, 2009. "Marchés publics et développement économique au Québec Leçons des expériences européennes et nord-américaines," CIRANO Project Reports 2009rp-02, CIRANO.
  5. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1988. "Analyse micro-économique du Code des marchés publics," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 39(4), pages 725-752.
  6. Gregory Lewis & Patrick Bajari, 2011. "Procurement Contracting With Time Incentives: Theory and Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 126(3), pages 1173-1211.
  7. Oecd, 2010. "Construction Industry," OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy, OECD Publishing, vol. 10(1), pages 153-171.
  8. Aubert, Cecile & Rey, Patrick & Kovacic, William E., 2006. "The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1241-1266, November.
  9. Gian Luigi Albano & Marco Sparro, 2010. "Flexible Strategies for Centralized Public Procurement," Review of Economics and Institutions, Università di Perugia, vol. 1(2).
  10. Eric W. Bond & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2008. "Trade costs and multimarket collusion," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(4), pages 1080-1104.
  11. Eshien Chong & Carine Staropoli & Anne Yvrande-Billon, 2013. "Enchères ou négociations dans les marchés publics : une analyse empirique," Revue d'économie industrielle, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(1), pages 51-72.
  12. De Silva, Dakshina G. & Dunne, Timothy & Kankanamge, Anuruddha & Kosmopoulou, Georgia, 2008. "The impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 150-181, January.
  13. repec:dau:papers:123456789/13637 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Ivaldi, Marc & Jullien, Bruno & Rey, Patrick & Seabright, Paul & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "The Economics of Tacit Collusion," IDEI Working Papers 186, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  15. Bana e Costa, Carlos A. & Corrêa, Émerson C. & De Corte, Jean-Marie & Vansnick, Jean-Claude, 2002. "Facilitating bid evaluation in public call for tenders: a socio-technical approach," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 227-242, June.
  16. Youri Chassin & Marcelin Joanis, 2010. "Détecter et prévenir la collusion dans les marchés publics en construction: Meilleures pratiques favorisant la concurrence," CIRANO Project Reports 2010rp-13, CIRANO.
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