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A Welfare-Tradeoff-Ratio-Model of Social Preferences

  • Bjoern Hartig

    (CGS, University of Cologne)

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    This paper introduces a model of social preferences featuring a single parameter representing an individual's disposition to share resources with others. The parameter reacts to observed behavior of others in a clearly defined manner. Therefore, the model allows the numerical analysis of reciprocal interaction. Based on evolutionary concepts, the model is characterized by a very basic utility maximization condition and it is consistent with and often predictive of the results of a multitude of different behavioral games and phenomenon.

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    Paper provided by Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences in its series Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series with number 02-05.

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    Date of creation: 28 Sep 2011
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:cgr:cgsser:02-05
    Contact details of provider: Postal: 0221 / 470 5607
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    1. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2003. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," General Economics and Teaching 0303002, EconWPA.
    2. Bohnet, Iris & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2003. "Trust, Risk and Betrayal," Working Paper Series rwp03-041, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    3. Jason Dana & Roberto Weber & Jason Kuang, 2007. "Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 67-80, October.
    4. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
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