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Corporate Governance and Firms' Market Values: Time Series Evidence from Russia

Author

Listed:
  • Bernard S. Black

    (University of Texas at Austin)

  • Inessa Love

    (The World Bank)

  • Andrei Rachinsky

    (New Economic School/CEFIR)

Abstract

There is increasing evidence that broad measures of firm-level corporate governance predict higher share prices. However, almost all prior work relies on cross-sectional data. This work leaves open the possibility that endogeneity or omitted firm-level variables explain the observed correlations. We address the second possibility by offering time-series evidence from Russia for 1999-present, exploiting a number of available governance indices. We find an economically important and statistically strong correlation between governance and market value in OLS with firm clusters and in firm random effects and firm fixed effects regressions. We also find significant differences in the predictive power of different indices, and in the components of these indices. How one measures governance matters.

Suggested Citation

  • Bernard S. Black & Inessa Love & Andrei Rachinsky, 2005. "Corporate Governance and Firms' Market Values: Time Series Evidence from Russia," Working Papers w0053, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    • Handle: RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0053
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Paul Gompers & Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, 2003. "Corporate Governance and Equity Prices," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(1), pages 107-156.
    2. Bernard Yeung & Randall Morck & Daniel Wolfenzon, 2004. "Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment and Growth," Working Papers 04-21, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    3. William N. Goetzmann & Matthew Spiegel & Andrey Ukhov, 2003. "Modeling and Measuring Russian Corporate Governance: The Case of Russian Preferred and Common Shares," NBER Working Papers 9469, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Art Durnev & E. Han Kim, 2005. "To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(3), pages 1461-1493, June.
    5. Jeffrey M Wooldridge, 2010. "Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262232588, December.
    6. William Goetzmann & Matthew Spiegel & Andrey Ukhov, 2002. "Modeling and Measuring Russian Corporate Governance: The Case of Russian Preferred and Common Shares (English Version)," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm278, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Oct 2002.
    7. William Goetzmann & Matthew Spiegel & Andrey Ukhov, 2003. "Modeling and Measuring Russian Corporate Governance: The Case of Russian Preferred and Common Shares (Russian Version)," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm402, Yale School of Management.
    8. Black, Bernard, 2001. "The corporate governance behavior and market value of Russian firms," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 89-108, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Goriaev, Alexei & Zabotkin, Alexei, 2006. "Risks of investing in the Russian stock market: Lessons of the first decade," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 380-397, December.
    2. Mihails Kuznecovs & Sarmistha Pal, 2011. "Does Corporate Governance Reform Necessarily Boost Firm Performance? Recent Evidence from Russia," CEDI Discussion Paper Series 11-06, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University.
    3. Yik Fen, Yvonne P'ng, 2019. "Tobin’s Q and its Determinants: A study on Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd," MPRA Paper 93894, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Olga Lazareva & Andrei Rachinsky & Sergey Stepanov, 2008. "Corporate Governance, Ownership Structures and Investment in Transition Economies: the Case of Russia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan," Working Papers w0119, New Economic School (NES).
    5. Marco Wölfle, 2009. "Information-based trade in Russia and the effects of listing abroad," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 42(4), pages 229-262, November.
    6. Olga Lazareva & Andrei Rachinsky & Sergey Stepanov, 2008. "A Survey of Corporate Governance in Russia," Springer Books, in: Robert W. McGee (ed.), Corporate Governance in Transition Economies, chapter 32, pages 315-349, Springer.
    7. Soloviev, Vladimir, 2009. "Экономико-Математическое Моделирование Рынка Программного Обеспечения: Монография. — М.: Вега-Инфо, 2009. — 176 С [Economic and mathematical modelling of software market]," MPRA Paper 28974, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Malik, Saif Ullah, 2012. "Relationship between Corporate Governance Score and Stock Prices: Evidence from KSE- 30 Index Companies," MPRA Paper 44475, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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