Electoral Cycles in Savings Bank Lending
We provide evidence that German savings banks â€“ where local politicians are by law involved in their management â€“ systematically adjust lending policies in response to local electoral cycles. The different timing of county elections across states and the existence of a control group of cooperative banks â€“ that are very similar to savings banks but lack their political connectedness â€“ allow for clean identification of causal effects of county elections on savings banksâ€™ lending. These effects are economically meaningful and robust to various specifications. Moreover, politically induced lending increases in incumbent party entrenchment and in the contestedness of upcoming elections.
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- Florian Englmaier & Till Stowasser, 2017.
"Electoral Cycles in Savings Bank Lending,"
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