One-Sided Private Provision of Public Goods with Implicit Lindahl Pricing
We consider a sequential game in which one player produces a public good and the other player can influence this decision by making an unconditional transfer. An efficient allocation requires the Lindahl property: the sum of the two (implicit) individual prices has to be equal to the resource cost of the public good. Under mild conditions this requires a personal price for the providing player that lies below half of the resource cost. These results can, for example, justify high marginal taxes on wages of secondary earners.
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- Meier, Volker & Rainer, Helmut, 2012.
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- Martin F. Hellwig, 2003. "Public-Good Provision with Many Participants," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(3), pages 589-614.
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- Myles,Gareth D., 1995. "Public Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521497695, December. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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