One-sided private provision of public goods with implicit Lindahl pricing
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- Volker Meier, 2013. "One-sided private provision of public goods with implicit Lindahl pricing," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 110(2), pages 181-186, October.
- Volker Meier, 2010. "One-Sided Private Provision of Public Goods with Implicit Lindahl Pricing," CESifo Working Paper Series 3295, CESifo.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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