IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_2346.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Employment Protection: The Case of Limited Enforceability

Author

Listed:
  • Florian Baumann

Abstract

This paper shows that the effects of employment protection critically depend on its enforcement. For this purpose, we capture evasion of employment protection via market exit in a setting of monopolistic competition. We find that the number of firms entering the market depends on firing costs only in the case of imperfect enforcement of employment protection. Furthermore, the possibility to circumvent firing restrictions by exiting the market mitigates the adverse efficiency effects of employment protection and can reverse the sign of the change in employment associated with an increase in firing costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Florian Baumann, 2008. "Employment Protection: The Case of Limited Enforceability," CESifo Working Paper Series 2346, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2346
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp2346.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael Neugart & Donald Storrie, 2006. "The emergence of temporary work agencies," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(1), pages 137-156, January.
    2. Boeri, Tito, 1999. "Enforcement of employment security regulations, on-the-job search and unemployment duration," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 65-89, January.
    3. Monique Ebell & Christian Haefke, 2002. "Product Market Deregulation and Labor Market Outcomes," Working Papers 02.08, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee.
    4. Bertola, Giuseppe, 1994. "Flexibility, investment, and growth," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 215-238, October.
    5. Olivier Blanchard & Francesco Giavazzi, 2003. "Macroeconomic Effects of Regulation and Deregulation in Goods and Labor Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(3), pages 879-907.
    6. Pedro Portugal & Olivier Blanchard, 2001. "What Hides Behind an Unemployment Rate: Comparing Portuguese and U.S. Labor Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 187-207, March.
    7. Richard Martin & Steeve Mongrain & Sean Parkinson, 2004. "Severance Payments and Unemployment Insurance: A Commitment Issue," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 6(4), pages 593-606, October.
    8. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
    9. Samaniego, Roberto M., 2006. "Do Firing Costs Affect The Incidence Of Firm Bankruptcy?," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(4), pages 467-501, September.
    10. Dixit, Avinash K & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1977. "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(3), pages 297-308, June.
    11. E. Galdon-Sanchez, Jose & Guell, Maia, 2003. "Dismissal conflicts and unemployment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 323-335, April.
    12. Burda, Michael C., 1991. "Monopolistic competition, costs of adjustment, and the behavior of European manufacturing employment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 61-79, January.
    13. Olivier Blanchard & Jean Tirole, 2004. "The Optimal Design of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection. A First Pass," NBER Working Papers 10443, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. O Blanchard & A Landier, 2002. "The Perverse Effects of Partial Labour Market Reform: fixed--Term Contracts in France," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(480), pages 214-244, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2012. "On the evasion of employment protection legislation," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 9-17.
    2. Susanne Prantl & Alexandra Spitz‐Oener, 2009. "How does entry regulation influence entry into self‐employment and occupational mobility?1," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 17(4), pages 769-802, October.
    3. Boeri, Tito & Garibaldi, Pietro & Moen, Espen R., 2017. "Inside severance pay," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 211-225.
    4. Pierre, Gaëlle & Scarpetta, Stefano, 2004. "Employment Regulations through the Eyes of Employers: Do They Matter and How Do Firms Respond to Them?," IZA Discussion Papers 1424, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Antonio Scialà & Riccardo Tilli, 2009. "Financing Unemployment Benefits Through Fiscal Policies and Increasing Competition," The IUP Journal of Public Finance, IUP Publications, vol. 0(1), pages 53-67, February.
    6. Florian Baumann & Mario Mechtel & Nikolai Stähler, 2011. "Employment Protection and Temporary Work Agencies," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 25(3), pages 308-329, September.
    7. Andrea Vindigni & Simone Scotti & Cristina Tealdi, 2015. "Uncertainty and the Politics of Employment Protection," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 209-267.
    8. Andrea Bassanini & Romain Duval, 2006. "The Determinants of Unemployment across OECD Countries," Post-Print halshs-00120584, HAL.
    9. Antonio Scial… & Riccardo Tilli, 2007. "Financing unemployment benefits by goods market competition: fiscal policy and deregulation with market imperfections," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0047, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    10. Koskela, Erkki & Stenbacka, Rune, 2012. "The relationship between product market competition and unemployment with profit sharing," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 291-297.
    11. Kauppi, Heikki & Koskela, Erkki & Stenbacka, Rune, 2004. "Equilibrium unemployment and investment under product and labour market imperfections," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 11/2004, Bank of Finland.
    12. Elke Jahn & Enzo Weber, 2016. "The effect of temporary help jobs on employment volatility," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 49(1), pages 412-427, February.
    13. Christian Grund, 2006. "Severance payments for dismissed employees in Germany," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 49-71, July.
    14. Boeri, Tito & Garibaldi, Pietro & Moen, Espen R., 2014. "Severance Pay," CEPR Discussion Papers 10182, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Kauppi, Heikki & Koskela, Erkki & Stenbacka, Rune, 2004. "Equilibrium Unemployment and Investment Under Product and Labour Market Imperfections," IZA Discussion Papers 1058, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    16. Heikki Kauppi & Erkki Koskela & Rune Stenbacka, 2004. "Equilibrium Unemployment and Capital Intensity Under Product and Labor Market Imperfections," CESifo Working Paper Series 1343, CESifo.
    17. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2004_011 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/7hh2up94ii8d2rg9pa9vg9eh3t is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Alexandre Janiak & Paulo Santos Monteiro, 2011. "Inflation and Welfare in Long‐Run Equilibrium with Firm Dynamics," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(5), pages 795-834, August.
    20. Kyoji Fukao & Cristiano Perugini, 2021. "The Long‐Run Dynamics of the Labor Share in Japan," Review of Income and Wealth, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 67(2), pages 445-480, June.
    21. Josef Falkinger & Volker Grossmann, 2003. "Workplaces in the Primary Economy and Wage Pressure in the Secondary Labor Market," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(3), pages 523-544, September.
    22. Forni, L. & Gerali, A. & Pisani, M., 2010. "Macroeconomic Effects Of Greater Competition In The Service Sector: The Case Of Italy," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(5), pages 677-708, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    employment protection; evasion; market entry and exit;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2346. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Klaus Wohlrabe (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cesifde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.