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Research Waves

Author

Listed:
  • Mariagiovanna Baccara
  • Gilat Levy
  • Ronny Razin

Abstract

Competing research waves start and grow as scientists choose their specialization driven by career incentives. We build a strategic experimentation framework where agents irreversibly choose between two risky fields, and information arrives faster as more agents specialize in a field. In the "bad news" case, if no news arrives, all agents join a bandwagon wave into one field. In the "good news"' case, both fields are explored in two sequential surges, followed by slow entry into the initially inferior field. We describe how the equilibrium depends on the information-production technology, and assess the impact of first-mover advantages, congestion, and deadlines.

Suggested Citation

  • Mariagiovanna Baccara & Gilat Levy & Ronny Razin, 2025. "Research Waves," CESifo Working Paper Series 12248, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12248
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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