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A Theory of Self-Prospection

Author

Listed:
  • Polina Borisova

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Nikhil Vellodi

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

A present-biased decision maker (DM) faces a two-armed bandit problem whose risky arm generates random payoffs at exponentially distributed times. The DM learns about payoff arrivals through informative feedback. At the unique stationary Markov perfect equilibrium of the multi-self game, positive feedback supports greater equilibrium welfare than both negative and transparent feedback. Regardless of the form of feedback, the DM's behavior exhibits indecision, deriving from their desire to procrastinate. We relate our findings to the theory of self-prospection -the process of imagining future goals and outcomes when seeking motivation in the present.

Suggested Citation

  • Polina Borisova & Nikhil Vellodi, 2024. "A Theory of Self-Prospection," PSE Working Papers halshs-04721098, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-04721098
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04721098v1
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    File URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04721098v1/document
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    References listed on IDEAS

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