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Assortative Mating and Couple Taxation: A Note

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  • Giacomo Corneo

Abstract

An often neglected implication of couple taxation is its impact on marital sorting. A tractable model of such an impact is offered in this paper. It reveals that, as compared to joint taxation with income splitting, individual taxation makes higher-ability individuals more picky in the marriage market, which translates into a higher degree of economic homogamy in society. Furthermore, a shift from joint to individual taxation is predicted to reduce the average quality of marriages in the population.

Suggested Citation

  • Giacomo Corneo, 2025. "Assortative Mating and Couple Taxation: A Note," CESifo Working Paper Series 11643, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11643
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies

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