Pure Equilibrium Strategies in Multi-unit Auctions with Private Value Bidders
The paper examines a general class of multi-unit auctions. The class of games investigated includes uniform-price, pay-your-bid, all-pay and Vickrey auctions as special cases. The seller offers k identical units of goods and sets the minimum accepted bid. Bidders have atomless valuation distributions and they submit up to k bids. For this class, the existence of Nash equilibrium in a measurable strategy space and weakly increasing pure strategy space is proven. In many cases any equilibrium strategies can be modified in such a way that they form a pure strategy equilibrium. Properties of standard strategies in multi-unit auctions are analyzed.
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- Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1994.
"An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction,"
Game Theory and Information
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- Michal Bresky, 2008. "Properties of Equilibrium Strategies in Multiple-Unit, Uniform-Price Auctions," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp354, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
- Lizzeri, Alessandro & Persico, Nicola, 2000. "Uniqueness and Existence of Equilibrium in Auctions with a Reserve Price," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 83-114, January.
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