Asymmetric Learning Spillovers
In this paper, I employ a linear-quadratic model of an industry characterized by learning by doing to examine the implications of asymmetric learning spillovers. Importantly, I show that distribution of spillover benefits can influence market structure in ways that can not be seen in models where spillovers are symmetric. If spillovers are asymmetric, a tradeoff between improved industry performance and increased market concentration can arise which does not occur when they are symmetric. This tradeoff leads to a policy dilemma; whether to promote static or dynamic efficiency in markets where learning is important.
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- Ghemawat, Pankaj & Spence, A Michael, 1985. "Learning Curve Spillovers and Market Performance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(5), pages 839-52, Supp..
- Reynolds, Stanley S, 1986. "Strategic Capital Investment in the American Aluminum Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(3), pages 225-45, March.
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- A. M. Spence, 1981. "The Learning Curve and Competition," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(1), pages 49-70, Spring.
- Kydland, Finn, 1975. "Noncooperative and Dominant Player Solutions in Discrete Dynamic Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 16(2), pages 321-35, June.
- Kydland, Finn, 1977. "Equilibrium solutions in dynamic dominant-player models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 307-324, August.
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