Teaching Nash Equilibrium and Strategy Dominance: A Classroom Experiment on the Beauty Contest
The aim of this investigation is to display how the use of classroom experiments may be a good pedagogical tool to teach the Nash equilibrium (NE) concept. The basic game for our purposes is a repeated version of the Beauty Contest Game (BCG), a simple guessing game whose repetition lets students react to other players’ choices and to converge iteratively to the equilibrium solution. We performed this experiment with undergraduate students without any previous knowledge about game theory. After four rounds, we observed in all groups a clear decreasing tendency in the average chosen number. So, our findings prove that, by playing a repeated BCG, students quickly learn how to reach the NE solution.
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- Duffy, John & Nagel, Rosemarie, 1997. "On the Robustness of Behaviour in Experimental "Beauty Contest" Games," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(445), pages 1684-1700, November.
- Shinichi Hirota & Shyam Sunder, 2002.
"Stock Market as a 'Beauty Contest': Investor Beliefs and Price Bubbles sans Dividend Anchors,"
Yale School of Management Working Papers
ysm2, Yale School of Management.
- Shinichi Hirota & Shyam NMI Sunder, 2002. "Stock Market as a 'Beauty Contest': Investor Beliefs and Price Bubbles sans Dividend Anchors," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm271, Yale School of Management.
- Brit Grosskopf & Rosemarie Nagel, 2007. "Rational reasoning or adaptive behavior? Evidence from two-person beauty contest games," Economics Working Papers 1068, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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