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Separating the Hawks from the Doves ∗

Author

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  • Henwood, Keith J.
  • Friedman, Daniel
  • Oprea, Ryan

Abstract

Human players in our laboratory experiment converge closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium when matched in a single population version of the standard Hawk-Dove game. When matched across two populations, the same players show clear movement towards an asymmetric (and very inequitable) pure Nash equilibrium of the same game. These ï¬ ndings support a distinctive prediction of evolutionary game theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Henwood, Keith J. & Friedman, Daniel & Oprea, Ryan, 2009. "Separating the Hawks from the Doves ∗," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt2zm6c64m, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
  • Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt2zm6c64m
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-666, May.
    2. Friedman, Daniel, 1996. "Equilibrium in Evolutionary Games: Some Experimental Results," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(434), pages 1-25, January.
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