Self-serving biased reference points
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- Andrea Gallice, 2009. "Self-serving biased reference points," Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID) University of Siena 0909, Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID), University of Siena.
References listed on IDEAS
- Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, 1997. "Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 109-126, Winter.
- Botond Kőszegi & Matthew Rabin, 2006.
"A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 121(4), pages 1133-1165.
- Koszegi, Botond & Rabin, Matthew, 2004. "A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt0w82b6nm, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Botond Koszegi & Matthew Rabin, 2005. "A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000341, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Botond Koszegi & Matthew Rabin, 2004. "A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences," Method and Hist of Econ Thought 0407001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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- Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2002. "Pretrial bargaining with self-serving bias and asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 163-176, June.
- Babcock, Linda, et al, 1995. "Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1337-1343, December.
- Eric Langlais, 2008. "Asymmetric information, self-serving bias and the pretrial negotiation impasse," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-30, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
- Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1984. "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 404-415, Autumn.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Andrea Gallice, 2012.
"Strategic Announcements of Reference Points in Disputes and Litigations,"
003, Department of Economics and Statistics (Dipartimento di Scienze Economico-Sociali e Matematico-Statistiche), University of Torino.
- Andrea Gallice, 2012. "Strategic announcements of reference points in disputes and litigations," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 279, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Yusuke Mori, 2013. "A Formal Behavioral Model of Firm Boundaries: Why Does Authority Relation Mitigate Ex Post Adaptation Problems?," ISER Discussion Paper 0863, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Mori, Yusuke, 2012. "How Can Integration Reduce Inefficiencies Due to Ex Post Adaptation?," Working Paper Series 142, Center for Japanese Business Studies (HJBS), Graduate School of Commerce and Management Hitotsubashi University.
More about this item
Keywordsself-serving bias; reference dependent preferences; litigation; trial vs settlement; bankruptcy problem; optimal allocation;
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
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