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Does a Swing Voter Model with Voter Turnout reflect the closeness of Indian State Elections: 1957 – 2018?

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Abstract

In the classic model of Besley, Persson and Strum (2010) voters are viewed as either committed to a political party or uncommitted, available for capture by the offer of policies that better reflect the programs they desire. Through an inter-party electoral competition for the support of such swing voters government services become aligned with those most desired by the electorate and the efficiency by which government services are provided is enhanced. In this paper we extend the BPS model to incorporate voter turnout, develop a new method of measuring the salience of noneconomic issues and then test the model's predictions on election data from 14 Indian States between the years 1957 and 2018. The results are broadly consistent with the predictions of the model but fit particularly well the lesser developed, so-called BIMAROU states. That is, an election is more competitive, as measured by having a smaller first versus second place vote share margin, when voter turnout is higher and both the proportion of asymmetrically adjusted safe seats and the state distribution of vote volatilities across constituencies are lower.

Suggested Citation

  • J. Stephen Ferris & Bharatee Bhusana Dash, 2021. "Does a Swing Voter Model with Voter Turnout reflect the closeness of Indian State Elections: 1957 – 2018?," Carleton Economic Papers 21-08, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 14 Jun 2022.
  • Handle: RePEc:car:carecp:21-08
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    1. Flora Pandya & Suresh Maind, 2017. "Panel data analysis: convergence of Indian states with infrastructure," Journal of Social and Economic Development, Springer;Institute for Social and Economic Change, vol. 19(1), pages 181-195, April.
    2. Besley, Timothy & Persson, Torsten & Sturm, Daniel, 2010. "Political competition, policy and growth: theory and evidence from the United States," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 121718, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson & Daniel M. Sturm, 2010. "Political Competition, Policy and Growth: Theory and Evidence from the US," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 77(4), pages 1329-1352.
    4. J. Stephen Ferris & Bharatee Bhusana Dash & Marcel-Cristian Voia, 2021. "Does Income Inequality enter into an Aggregate Model of Voter Turnout? Evidence from Canada and Indian States," Carleton Economic Papers 21-09, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
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    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
    • O53 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Asia including Middle East

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