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New Directions in Development Economics: Theory or Empirics? A Symposium in Economic and Political Weekly

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Listed:
  • Abhijit Banerjee
  • Pranab Bardhan

    (University of California at Berkeley)

  • Kaushik Basu
  • Ravi Kanbur

    (Boston University, Institute for Economic Development)

  • Dilip Mookherjee

    () (Institute for Economic Development, Boston University)

Abstract

In May 2004 a conference was held at Cornell University entitled “75 Years of Development Research.”. Apart from the usual array of theoretical and empirical papers on development, a number of panels took stock of the state of development economics and discussed a range of methodological issues. One commentary that stood out in the challenge it posed to the current state of development economics was, “Is there Too Little Theory in Development Economics Today?” by Dilip Mookherjee. He answered his own question in the affirmative. Given the debate it generated, after the conference it was circulated to a number of leading development economists who had been present at the conference, and responses were invited. Pranab Bardhan sent in a response, “Theory or Empirics in Development Economics,” as did Kaushik Basu, “The New Empirical Development Economics: Remarks on its Philosophical Foundations.” These papers were largely supportive of the position taken by Mookherjee. There then followed a response to all three of these papers by Abhijit Banerjee, “‘New Development Economics’ and the Challenge to Theory,” which mounted a defense of the current empirical methods in development economics. Ravi Kanbur then followed with his comments, “Goldilocks Development Economics.” Ravi Kanbur also took the responsibility of coordinating the contributions. These five papers are being brought together here in this symposium in Economic and Political Weekly.

Suggested Citation

  • Abhijit Banerjee & Pranab Bardhan & Kaushik Basu & Ravi Kanbur & Dilip Mookherjee, 2005. "New Directions in Development Economics: Theory or Empirics? A Symposium in Economic and Political Weekly," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series DP-153, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bos:iedwpr:dp-153
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean Cartier-Bresson, 2013. "Le pouvoir du positivisme et ses limites : microéconométrie et macroéconométrie actuelles du développement," Working Papers hal-00847005, HAL.
    2. Barr, Abigail & Packard, Truman & Serra, Danila, 2012. "Participatory accountability and collective action : evidence from field experiments in Albanian schools," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6027, The World Bank.
    3. James Roumasset, 2010. "Wither the Economics of Agricultural Development?," Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Southeast Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture (SEARCA), vol. 7(1), pages 1-22, June.
    4. Duflo, Esther & Glennerster, Rachel & Kremer, Michael, 2008. "Using Randomization in Development Economics Research: A Toolkit," Handbook of Development Economics, Elsevier.
    5. Lundvall , Bengt-Åke & Vang , Jan & Joseph , KJ & Chaminade , Cristina, 2013. "Bridging Innovation System Research and Development Studies: challenges and research opportunities," Papers in Innovation Studies 2013/33, Lund University, CIRCLE - Center for Innovation, Research and Competences in the Learning Economy.
    6. Judith Favereau, 2014. "La lutte contre la pauvreté à l'épreuve des essais cliniques. Réflexion sur l'approche expérimentale de l'économie du développement," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 14026, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    7. Mckenzie,David J. & Paffhausen,Anna Luisa, 2015. "Development economics as taught in developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7521, The World Bank.
    8. Rodrik, Dani, 2008. "The New Development Economics: We Shall Experiment, but How Shall We Learn?," Working Paper Series rwp08-055, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    9. Judith Favereau, 2014. "La lutte contre la pauvreté à l'épreuve des essais cliniques. Réflexion sur l'approche expérimentale de l'économie du développement," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00974686, HAL.

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