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Incentives for Collective Innovation

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  • Gregorio Curello

Abstract

Agents exert hidden effort to produce randomly-sized innovations in a technology they share. Returns from using the technology grow as it develops, but so does the opportunity cost of effort, due to an ‘exploration-exploitation’ trade-off. As monitoring is imperfect, there exists a unique (strongly) symmetric equilibrium, and effort in any equilibrium ceases no later than in the single-agent problem. Small innovations may hurt all agents in the symmetric equilibrium, as they severely reduce effort. Allowing agents to discard innovations increases effort and payoffs, preserving uniqueness. Under natural conditions, payoffs rise above those of all equilibria with forced disclosure.

Suggested Citation

  • Gregorio Curello, 2024. "Incentives for Collective Innovation," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_566, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2024_566
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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