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The role of information in repeated games with frequent actions

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  • Yuliy Sannikov
  • Andrzej Skrzypacz

    () (GSB Stanford University)

Abstract

We show that the ways incentives can be provided during dynamic interaction depend very crucially on the manner in which players learn information. This conclusion is established in a general stationary environment with noisy public monitoring and frequent actions. The monitoring process can be represented by a sum of a multi-dimensional Brownian component and a jump process. We show that jumps can be used to provide incentives both with transfers and value burning while continuous information can be used to provide incentives only with transfers. Also, it is asymptotically optimal to use the cumulative realization of the Brownian component linearly. Additionally, we approximate the equilibrium payoff set for fixed small discount rates as the periods become short by a series of linear programming problems. These problems highlight how the two types of information can be used to provide incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Yuliy Sannikov & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2006. "The role of information in repeated games with frequent actions," 2006 Meeting Papers 871, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  • Handle: RePEc:red:sed006:871
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    Cited by:

    1. Frei, Christoph & Bernard, Benjamin, 2016. "The folk theorem with imperfect public information in continuous time," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
    2. Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel, 2012. "The Limits of Discrete Time Repeated Games:Some Notes and Comments," Working Papers 2072/203171, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    3. Fudenberg, Drew & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 86-99, May.
    4. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 10(2), pages 173-192, April.
    5. Staudigl, Mathias, 2014. "A limit theorem for Markov decision processes," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 475, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    6. Pierre Yared, 2008. "The Use of Concessions in Forestalling War," 2008 Meeting Papers 32, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Hartman-Glaser, Barney & Piskorski, Tomasz & Tchistyi, Alexei, 2012. "Optimal securitization with moral hazard," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 186-202.
    8. Fudenberg, Drew & Ishii, Yuhta & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2014. "Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 487-514.
    9. Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru, 2016. "How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 332-359.
    10. Henri Pages & Dylan Possamaï, 2014. "A mathematical treatment of bank monitoring incentives," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 39-73, January.
    11. Piskorski, Tomasz & Westerfield, Mark M., 2016. "Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 242-281.
    12. Roman, Mihai Daniel, 2010. "A game theoretic approach of war with financial influences," MPRA Paper 38389, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Christian Bayer & Klaus Waelde, 2011. "Describing the Dynamics of Distributions in Search and Matching Models by Fokker-Planck Equations," Working Papers 1110, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, revised 21 Jul 2011.
    14. Kobayashi, Hajime & Ohta, Katsunori, 2012. "Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 636-647.
    15. Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel, 2011. "Public Monitoring with Uncertainty in the Time Repetitions," Working Papers 2072/179668, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    repeated games; dynamic incentives; frequent moves;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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