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Corporate Social Responsibility and Firms Ability to Collude


  • L. Lambertini
  • A. Tampieri


We examine a duopoly with polluting production where firms adopt a form of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to define their objective functions. Our analysis focusses on the bearings of CSR on collusion over an infinite horizon, sustained by either grim trigger strategies or optimal punishments. Our results suggest that assigning a weight to consumer surplus has a pro-competitive e¤ect under both full and partial collusion. Conversely, a higher impact of productivity on pollution has an anti-competitive effect under partial collusion, while exerting no effect under full collusion. Under partial collusion, the analysis of the isoquant map of the cartel reveals that complementarity arises between the two weights.

Suggested Citation

  • L. Lambertini & A. Tampieri, 2011. "Corporate Social Responsibility and Firms Ability to Collude," Working Papers wp778, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  • Handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp778

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Constantine Manasakis & Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2007. "Corporate Social Responsibility in Oligopoly," Working Papers 0707, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
    2. Damania, D., 1996. "Pollution Taxes and Pollution Abatement in an Oligopoly Supergame," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 323-336, May.
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    6. Lambertini, Luca & Tampieri, Alessandro, 2015. "Incentives, performance and desirability of socially responsible firms in a Cournot oligopoly," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 40-48.
    7. David P. Baron, 2009. "A Positive Theory of Moral Management, Social Pressure, and Corporate Social Performance," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(1), pages 7-43, March.
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    12. Lundgren, Tommy, 2007. "On the Economics of Corporate Responsibility," Sustainable Investment and Corporate Governance Working Papers 2007/3, Sustainable Investment Research Platform.
    13. Aurora García-Gallego & Nikolaos Georgantzís, 2009. "Market Effects of Changes in Consumers' Social Responsibility," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(1), pages 235-262, March.
    14. Mark Bagnoli & Susan G. Watts, 2003. "Selling to Socially Responsible Consumers: Competition and The Private Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(3), pages 419-445, September.
    15. Brekke, Kjell Arne & Nyborg, Karine, 2008. "Attracting responsible employees: Green production as labor market screening," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 509-526, December.
    16. Ecchia, Giulio & Lambertini, Luca, 1997. "Minimum Quality Standards and Collusion," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 101-113, March.
    17. Aaron K. Chatterji & David I. Levine & Michael W. Toffel, 2009. "How Well Do Social Ratings Actually Measure Corporate Social Responsibility?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(1), pages 125-169, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Luca Lambertini & Arsen Palestini & Alessandro Tampieri, 2014. "CSR in an Asymmetric Duopoly with Environmental Externalities," CREA Discussion Paper Series 14-19, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg.
    2. Lisa Planer-Friedrich & Marco Sahm, 2017. "Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility," CESifo Working Paper Series 6506, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Planer-Friedrich, Lisa & Sahm, Marco, 2017. "Why Firms Should Care for All Consumers," Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168257, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Juan Pineiro-Chousa & Marcos Vizcaíno-González & M. Ángeles López-Cabarcos, 2016. "Reputation, Game Theory and Entrepreneurial Sustainability," Sustainability, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 8(11), pages 1-13, November.
    5. repec:ebl:ecbull:eb-17-00287 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Luciano Fanti & Domenico Buccella, 2017. "Profitability of corporate social responsibility in network industries," Discussion Papers 2017/216, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    7. Planer-Friedrich, Lisa & Sahm, Marco, 2017. "Strategic corporate social responsibility," BERG Working Paper Series 124, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.
    8. Pineiro-Chousa, Juan & Vizcaíno-González, Marcos, 2016. "A quantum derivation of a reputational risk premium," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 304-309.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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