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New Developments in Physician Agency: the Role of Patient Information

  • F. Barigozzi
  • R. Levaggi

In economic perspective, the agency relationship between a patient and his physician has dramatically changed in the past years and is still evolving. Great emphasis is now placed on communication issues. The debate on the amount and precision of information on his health status the patient would/should acquire is still open and likewise the definition of the role of the patient’s choice in the agency relationship. The debate is not only academic: in fact, it has important policy implications on the reimbursement schemes for physicians and informed consent.

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Paper provided by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna in its series Working Papers with number 550.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:550
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  1. Patricia M. Danzon, 1991. "Liability for Medical Malpractice," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(3), pages 51-69, Summer.
  2. Geanakoplos, John & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1989. "Psychological games and sequential rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 60-79, March.
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  8. Izabela Jelovac, 2001. "Physicians' payment contracts, treatment decisions and diagnosis accuracy," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(1), pages 9-25.
  9. Asher Wolinsky, 1993. "Competition in a Market for Informed Experts' Services," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(3), pages 380-398, Autumn.
  10. Paul Calcott, 1999. "Demand inducement as cheap talk," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 8(8), pages 721-733.
  11. Gravelle, Hugh, 1999. "Capitation contracts: access and quality," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 315-340, June.
  12. Dranove, David, 1988. "Demand Inducement and the Physician/Patient Relationship," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(2), pages 281-98, April.
  13. De Jaegher, Kris & Jegers, Marc, 2000. "A model of physician behaviour with demand inducement," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 231-258, March.
  14. Koszegi, Botond, 2003. "Health anxiety and patient behavior," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 1073-1084, November.
  15. Scott, Anthony, 2000. "Economics of general practice," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1175-1200 Elsevier.
  16. F. Barigozzi & R. Levaggi, 2006. "A Rationale for Searching (Imprecise) Health Information," Working Papers 559, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  17. Charles E. Phelps, 1992. "Diffusion of Information in Medical Care," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 23-42, Summer.
  18. Andrew Caplin & John Leahy, 2001. "Psychological Expected Utility Theory and Anticipatory Feelings," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(1), pages 55-79.
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