IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/boj/bojwps/ron231212a.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Central Bank Finances and Monetary Policy Conduct

Author

Listed:
  • Monetary Affairs Department

    (Bank of Japan)

Abstract

1. Since the late 1990s, the Bank of Japan, faced with the zero lower bound on interest rates, has implemented various unconventional monetary policy measures. Major overseas central banks have also implemented large-scale asset purchases and other measures since the outbreak of the Global Financial Crisis. Given that such unconventional monetary policies accompanied by large-scale balance sheet expansions have the potential to have a large impact on central banks' finances when monetary policy is tightened, there has been debate on the potential impact on central banks' ability to conduct monetary policy and, by extension, confidence in their currencies. 2. Central banks earn interest income on the government bonds they purchase and short-term loans they provide, while their liabilities -- current deposits at the central bank (required reserves) and banknotes -- are not subject to interest. This structure usually allows them to generate stable profits (seigniorage). 3. When the central bank expands its balance sheet under unconventional monetary policy through, for example, the purchase of government bonds, this leads to increases in holdings of government bonds and other assets on the asset side and in current deposits (excess reserves) on the liability side. While the central bank needs to pay interest on excess reserves, since the interest rate on government bonds purchased usually exceeds the interest rate on excess reserves, interest income and other income increase in line with the rise in holdings of government bonds and other assets, so that the central bank's overall profits increase. On the other hand, during a phase when monetary policy moves toward tightening and the balance sheet shrinks, holdings of government bonds will decrease on the asset side, while excess reserves will decrease on the liability side. When, during this phase, the central bank raises the interest rate on excess reserves, interest expenses will increase, putting downward pressure on its profits. Subsequently, however, interest expenses will decline as excess reserves decrease. Furthermore, since government bond holdings will be successively replaced by higher-yielding government bonds, interest income will increase. Therefore, while the central bank may temporarily make losses during this process, even if this occurs, profits will eventually recover. The extent to which profits fluctuate during a phase of balance sheet contraction can differ substantially depending on factors such as (1) the size of the balance sheet, (2) the extent to which proceeds from the redemption of government bonds at maturity are reinvested, (3) developments in short-term and long-term interest rates, and (4) developments in banknotes in circulation. 4. Under a fiat money system, it is important to consider decreases in the central bank's profits and capital from the perspective of whether and how they affect the conduct of monetary policy. In this regard, there are two schools of thought: one is that they adversely affect monetary policy conduct, and the other is that they do not. There are also a variety of positions regarding the theoretical reasons underpinning these views. 5. Major overseas central banks have recently been tightening monetary policy rapidly and substantially in response to inflation, leading to decreases in their profits and capital. However, in their external communication, they have emphasized that even if they temporarily make losses or have negative equity, this will not impede their ability to conduct monetary policy. Moreover, these central banks have noted that, although their profits are currently decreasing, it is also the case that they increased during the past balance sheet expansion, and that assessments of their large-scale easing policies should focus on the positive effects on the economy overall. Against this backdrop, with a view to avoiding adverse consequences, such as doubts about their ability to conduct monetary policy and a decline in their credibility, these central banks, in recognition of the importance of central bank capital, have maintained their stance to work on restoring their capital over time. Under these circumstances, no particular impediments have arisen in any of the countries or regions in terms of ensuring confidence in their respective currencies through the appropriate conduct of monetary policy. 6. In light of the above, the relationship between central bank finances and monetary policy conduct can be summarized as follows. Under a fiat money system, confidence in the currency is not directly ensured by the assets held by the central bank or its financial soundness, but by the appropriate conduct of monetary policy with the aim of achieving price stability. Based on this premise, central banks are generally set up in such a way that they make profits from a somewhat longer-term perspective and, moreover, can supply their own means of payment and settlement. Therefore, even if the central bank temporarily makes losses or has negative equity, this does not impede its ability to conduct monetary policy. That said, this does not mean that the central bank can run up unlimited losses and negative equity. If the central bank's financial risks become a matter of undue attention and give rise to unnecessary confusion over monetary policy, there is a risk that this could lead to a decline in its credibility. Therefore, ensuring the soundness of the central bank's finances is important. The Bank of Japan deems it appropriate to continue with conducting appropriate policy while also paying attention to its financial soundness.

Suggested Citation

  • Monetary Affairs Department, 2023. "Central Bank Finances and Monetary Policy Conduct," Bank of Japan Working Paper Series 23-12-12, Bank of Japan.
  • Handle: RePEc:boj:bojwps:ron231212a
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.boj.or.jp/en/research/brp/ron_2023/data/ron231212a.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mr. Peter Stella, 1997. "Do Central Banks Need Capital?," IMF Working Papers 1997/083, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Ricardo Reis, 2015. "Different Types of Central Bank Insolvency and the Central Role of Seignorage," NBER Working Papers 21226, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Kento Yoshizawa & Kohei Maehashi & Hiroaki Yanagihara & Yoichi Kadogawa & Masakazu Inada, 2021. "Developments in Banknotes in Circulation since the Start of the Pandemic," Bank of Japan Review Series 21-E-6, Bank of Japan.
    4. Gustavo Adler & Pedro Castro & Camilo Tovar, 2016. "Does Central Bank Capital Matter for Monetary Policy?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 183-205, February.
    5. Del Negro, Marco & Sims, Christopher A., 2015. "When does a central bank׳s balance sheet require fiscal support?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 1-19.
    6. Alyssa G. Anderson & Dave Na & Bernd Schlusche & Zeynep Senyuz, 2022. "An Analysis of the Interest Rate Risk of the Federal Reserve’s Balance Sheet, Part 1: Background and Historical Perspective," FEDS Notes 2022-07-15-2, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    7. Fujiki, Hiroshi & Tomura, Hajime, 2017. "Fiscal cost to exit quantitative easing: the case of Japan," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 1-11.
    8. Alyssa G. Anderson & Philippa Marks & Dave Na & Bernd Schlusche & Zeynep Senyuz, 2022. "An Analysis of the Interest Rate Risk of the Federal Reserve’s Balance Sheet, Part 2: Projections under Alternative Interest Rate Paths," FEDS Notes 2022-07-15-3, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Atsushi Tanaka, 2021. "Central Bank Capital and Credibility: A Literature Survey," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 63(2), pages 249-262, June.
    2. Atsushi Tanaka, 2020. "Central Bank Capital and Credibility: A Literature Survey," Discussion Paper Series 208, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised May 2020.
    3. Atsushi Tanaka, 2020. "Monetary Base Controllability after an Exit from Quantitative Easing," Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice, Central bank of Montenegro, vol. 9(3), pages 123-134.
    4. Pierpaolo Benigno & Salvatore Nisticò, 2020. "Non-neutrality of Open-Market Operations," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 175-226, July.
    5. Atsushi Tanaka, 2019. "How Can a Central Bank Exit Quantitative Easing Without Rapidly Shrinking its Balance Sheet?," Discussion Paper Series 196, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University.
    6. Sascha Buetzer, 2022. "Advancing the Monetary Policy Toolkit through Outright Transfers," IMF Working Papers 2022/087, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Michele Cavallo & Marco Del Negro & W. Scott Frame & Jamie Grasing & Benjamin A. Malin & Carlo Rosa, 2019. "Fiscal Implications of the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet Normalization," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 15(5), pages 255-306, December.
    8. Jakob Korbinian Eberl, 2016. "The Collateral Framework of the Eurosystem and Its Fiscal Implications," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 69.
    9. Fujiki, Hiroshi & Tomura, Hajime, 2017. "Fiscal cost to exit quantitative easing: the case of Japan," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 1-11.
    10. Stephen Quinn & William Roberds, 2016. "Death of a Reserve Currency," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 12(4), pages 63-103, December.
    11. Reis, Ricardo, 2016. "Funding quantitative easing to target inflation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 67883, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    12. Andreas Hoffmann & Axel Loeffler, 2017. "Surplus liquidity, central bank losses and the use of reserve requirements in emerging markets," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(5), pages 990-998, November.
    13. Michal Franta & Tomas Holub & Branislav Saxa, 2018. "Balance Sheet Implications of the Czech National Bank's Exchange Rate Commitment," Working Papers 2018/10, Czech National Bank.
    14. Caballero, Diego & Lucas, André & Schwaab, Bernd & Zhang, Xin, 2020. "Risk endogeneity at the lender/investor-of-last-resort," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 283-297.
    15. Hess Chung & Etienne Gagnon & Taisuke Nakata & Matthias Paustian & Bernd Schlusche & James Trevino & Diego Vilán & Wei Zheng, 2020. "Monetary Policy Options at the Effective Lower Bound: Assessing the Federal Reserve’s Current Policy Toolkit," CARF F-Series CARF-F-483, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    16. Atsushi Tanaka, 2018. "Monetary Base Controllability after an Exit from Quantitative Easing," Discussion Paper Series 181, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Jul 2018.
    17. Igor Goncharov & Vasso Ioannidou & Martin C. Schmalz, 2020. "(Why) do central banks care about their profits?," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 018, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    18. Mr. Andrew J Swiston & Ms. Florencia Frantischek & Mr. Przemek Gajdeczka & Alexander Herman, 2014. "Central Bank Financial Strength in Central America and the Dominican Republic," IMF Working Papers 2014/087, International Monetary Fund.
    19. Igor Goncharov & Vasso Ioannidou & Martin C. Schmalz, 2017. "(Why) Do Central Banks Care About Their Profits?," CESifo Working Paper Series 6546, CESifo.
    20. Ricardo Reis, 2017. "QE in the Future: The Central Bank’s Balance Sheet in a Fiscal Crisis," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 65(1), pages 71-112, April.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:boj:bojwps:ron231212a. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Bank of Japan (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/bojgvjp.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.