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The chain store paradox

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  • Selten, Reinhard

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

Abstract

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  • Selten, Reinhard, 2017. "The chain store paradox," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 18, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    • Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:18
    as

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    File URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2909633/2911217
    File Function: First Version, 1974
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lester B. Lave, 1962. "An Empirical Approach to the Prisoners' Dilemma Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 76(3), pages 424-436.
    2. Melvin Guyer & John Fox & Henry Hamburger, 1973. "Format Effects in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 17(4), pages 719-744, December.
    3. Reinhard Selten, 1973. "A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition, where 4 are Few and 6 are Many," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 008, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    4. Reinhard Selten, 1974. "The Chain Store Paradox," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 018, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
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