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Optimal Wage Redistribution in the Presence of Adverse Selection in the Labor Market

Author

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  • Spencer Bastani

    (Department of Economics, Uppsala University; Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies; Uppsala Center for Labor Studies, Sweden; CESifo, Germany)

  • Tomer Blumkin

    (BGU)

  • Luca Micheletto

    (Department of Law, University of Milan, and Dondena Centre for Research on Social Dynamics and Public Policy, Bocconi University, Italy; Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies, Sweden; CESifo, Germany)

Abstract

In this paper we allude to a novel role played by the non-linear income tax system in the presence of adverse selection in the labor market due to asymmetric information between workers and firms. We show that an appropriate choice of the tax schedule enables the government to affect the wage distribution by controlling the transmission of information in the labor market. This represents an additional channel through which the government can foster the pursuit of its redistributive goals.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Spencer Bastani & Tomer Blumkin & Luca Micheletto, 2015. "Optimal Wage Redistribution in the Presence of Adverse Selection in the Labor Market," Working Papers 1507, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1507
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    Cited by:

    1. Aronsson, Thomas & Micheletto, Luca, 2017. "Optimal Redistributive Income Taxation and Efficiency Wages," Umeå Economic Studies 953, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    2. Spencer Bastani & Sören Blomquist & Luca Micheletto, 2020. "Pareto efficient income taxation without single-crossing," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(3), pages 547-594, October.
    3. Cremer, Helmuth & Roeder, Kerstin, 2017. "Social insurance with competitive insurance markets and risk misperception," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 138-147.
    4. Carlos E. da Costa & Lucas J. Maestri, 2019. "Optimal Mirrleesian taxation in non-competitive labor markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(4), pages 845-886, November.
    5. Spencer Bastani & Tomer Blumkin & Luca Micheletto, 2016. "Anti-discrimination Legislation and the Efficiency-Enhancing Role of Mandatory Parental Leave," Working Papers 088, "Carlo F. Dondena" Centre for Research on Social Dynamics (DONDENA), Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi.
    6. Kosonen, Tuomas & Matikka, Tuomas, 2020. "Discrete Labor Supply: Empirical Evidence and Implications," Working Papers 132, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
    7. Spencer Bastani & Tomer Blumkin & Luca Micheletto, 2021. "Optimal Redistribution in the Presence of Signaling," CESifo Working Paper Series 9210, CESifo.
    8. Thomas Aronsson & Luca Micheletto, 2021. "Optimal Redistributive Income Taxation and Efficiency Wages," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(1), pages 3-32, January.
    9. Thomas Aronsson & Luca Micheletto, 2017. "Optimal Redistributive Income Taxation and Efficiency Wages," Working Papers 107, "Carlo F. Dondena" Centre for Research on Social Dynamics (DONDENA), Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi.
    10. Spencer Bastani & Tomer Blumkin & Luca Micheletto, 2019. "The Welfare-Enhancing Role of Parental Leave Mandates," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 35(1), pages 77-126.
    11. Aronsson, Thomas & Bastani, Spencer & Tayibov, Khayyam, 2021. "Social Exclusion and Optimal Redistribution," Umeå Economic Studies 1004, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    12. Bastani, Spencer & Blumkin, Tomer & Micheletto, Luca, 2024. "Optimal redistribution and education signaling," Working Paper Series 2024:8, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    13. Albert Jan Hummel, 2021. "Monopsony Power, Income Taxation and Welfare," CESifo Working Paper Series 9128, CESifo.
    14. Gerritsen, Aart, 2016. "Optimal taxation when people do not maximize well-being," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 122-139.
    15. Firouz Gahvari & Luca Micheletto, 2020. "Wage endogeneity, tax evasion, and optimal nonlinear income taxation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(3), pages 501-531, June.
    16. Albert Jan Hummel, 2021. "Monopsony power, income taxation and welfare," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 21-051/VI, Tinbergen Institute.
    17. Spencer Bastani & Firouz Gahvari & Luca Micheletto, 2022. "Nonlinear Taxation of Income and Education in the Presence of Income-Misreporting," CESifo Working Paper Series 9987, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    adverse selection; labor market; optimal taxation; pooling; redistribution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

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