Designing Decisions Rules for Transnational Infraestructure Projects
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- Barberá, Salvador, 2003. "Designing Decisions Rules for Transnational Infrastructure Projects," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 3200, Inter-American Development Bank.
- Salvador Barberà, 2003. "Designing Decisions Rules for Transnational Infraestructure Projects," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 600.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
References listed on IDEAS
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Microeconomics
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- Jackson, Matthew O. & Barbera, Salvador, 2002. "Choosing How Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules," Working Papers 1145, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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"Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(3), pages 1011-1048.
- Salvador BARBER?Author-Email: salvador.barbera@uab.es & Matthew O. JACKSON, 2003. "Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 596.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Salvador Barberà & Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions," Working Papers 57, Barcelona School of Economics.
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